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Abstract 
Attention is a facet of cognition that is responsible for the development of most 
cognitive processes.  Insult to the brain prior to or during the development of attention 
can be detrimental to various aspects of cognitive development and, as a result, to a 
child’s ability to acquire new knowledge and skills.  One example of cerebral insult in 
childhood is stroke.  Given the importance of attention for the development of cognitive 
skills, identifying the factors of attention is critical to understanding cognitive outcomes 
in children with stroke.   
In the present investigation, a three-factor and a four-factor model of attention 
were tested using confirmatory factor analysis on a set of neuropsychological tests 
purported to measure various aspects of attention, in order to determine the model of 
attention best represented by a sample of children with arterial ischemic stroke.  It was 
determined that both a three- and four-factor model of attention fit the data equally well 
when the same measures were included in both models.  Despite similarities between the 
models, the four-factor model of attention was argued to be the best fit, due to theoretical, 
neuroanatomical, and developmental considerations.  When the four-factor model was 
used to determine predictors of outcome, both Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were 
significant predictors of outcome on the Shift and Focus/Execute factors of attention, but 
not on the Encode and Sustain factors.  The findings are discussed within the framework 
of a vulnerability vs. a plasticity model.  Implications for clinical practice are also 
considered.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Attention is a facet of cognition that is necessary for the development of many 
other cognitive processes.  Although attention is often referred to as a singular process, it 
is in fact recognized as consisting of a network of inter-related processes. Several models 
of attention exist, but all have limited application to children.  Identifying a representative 
model of attention is particularly important for understanding how attention is affected by 
early cerebral insult.  Children who experience an acquired brain injury typically have a 
variety of cognitive sequelae as a result, among which difficulty with attention is often a 
primary concern.  Impairment in attention has been relevant in research investigating the 
cognitive consequences of acquired brain injuries, including pre-frontal lesions, treatment 
with cranial radiation and chemotherapy, as well as stroke (Anderson, Jacobs, & Harvey, 
2005; Anderson, Godber, Smibert, Weiskop, & Ekert, 2004; Westmacott, MacGregor, 
Askalan, & deVeber, 2009).  The challenge with assessing attention in children is that 
there is currently no clear developmental model of attention.   
In the current investigation, a model of attention is identified for children with 
paediatric arterial ischemic stroke (AIS) by testing two of the most commonly accepted 
models of attention from the literature.  Predictors of outcomes on the individual factors 
of attention are also investigated in order to add to the understanding of the development 
of attentional abilities.  In the following introductory section, an overview of attention 
models is presented, including an explanation of the factors of attention within a 
developmental framework.  Next, a brief overview of paediatric stroke is outlined, 
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describing how cognitive processes, including attention, are commonly affected in this 
population.  Factors contributing to differential outcomes in children are also considered. 
Attention Overview 
Posner and Rothbart (2007) provide a broad definition of attention, stating that it 
“serves as a basic set of mechanisms that underlie our awareness of the world and the 
voluntary regulation of our thoughts and feelings.” (p. 6).  Attentional networks are 
connected to all other neural networks, and play a major role in the development of 
different cognitive abilities (Posner & Rothbart, 2007).  Research on brain maturation has 
long suggested that cerebral and cognitive development are intertwined; they develop 
through a nonlinear process of stages, where periods of growth are separated by plateaus 
of limited change (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990).  Recent imaging research has 
demonstrated that more basic functions (e.g., sensory and motor processes) mature earlier 
in life with the development of sensorimotor cortices, while the association cortices 
responsible for more complex processes (e.g., prefrontal cortex) develop later in life 
(Casey, Tottenham, Liston, & Durston, 2012).    
Cerebral and cognitive maturation also appear to influence each other in a 
reciprocal manner, whereby cerebral growth can affect cognitive outcome and cognitive 
development can, in turn, produce cerebral growth (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990).  The act 
of attending to a stimulus changes brain activity by increasing the neural processing in 
the areas involved in the responses to stimuli (Colombo, 2004); for example, as an 
individual attends to a visual stimulus, neural activity in the visual cortex is enhanced.  
Attention has a direct, and somewhat disproportionate, influence on outcomes of the 
physical structure of the brain and its functions.  Attending to different stimuli, either 
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repeatedly or over extended periods of time, during early maturation has a direct and 
significant influence on the development of specific neural regions and their related 
cognitive processes (Colombo, 2004).  In addition, attention may influence the 
development of other cognitive abilities by mediating the brain’s interaction with various 
experiences and different environments (Colombo, 2004).   
Basic attention skills can be assessed very early in young infants (Posner, 2004) 
and are likely present from birth.  Early attentional abilities appear to have a direct 
influence on the outcomes of other cognitive abilities (Richards, 2004).  Some 
investigators have measured attention skills in infants, and have suggested that early 
attentional abilities are a good indicator of general intellectual functioning later in life 
(Colombo, 1993).  Children’s brains may be more vulnerable to attention deficits than 
those of adults, given that their immature brains are in the process of developing and 
cognitive skills are only beginning to emerge (Anderson, Anderson, & Anderson, 2006).  
An inability to attend appropriately, in a child with a cortical impairment, may 
subsequently affect the acquisition of new skills in other cognitive domains, resulting in a 
global impairment in cognitive skills (Anderson et al., 2006).  Overall, attention appears 
to be one of the most fundamental processes involved in cognitive development.  There 
are, however, a variety of theories regarding the factors of attention and the network of 
brain regions responsible for different aspects of attentional processing.    
Factors of Attention 
Several different types of attention have been identified and relied on in research 
and clinical practice.  Selective attention is considered the ability to focus on a specific 
target stimulus, regardless of its location in space and despite competing stimuli.  
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Selective attention processes are considered to be mediated by temporal, parietal, and 
striatal regions of the brain (Posner & Cohen, 1984).  Sustained attention is considered 
the ability to attend to a stimulus or set of events that occur over an extended period of 
time; this aspect of attention is also known as vigilance (Stuss, Shallice, Alexander, & 
Picton, 1995).  A right lateral midfrontal system has been attributed to the process of 
sustained attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990).    
In attention research, it is also considered valuable to acknowledge processing 
speed as a form of executive-level attention.  There is no consistent definition of 
processing speed used throughout the literature, although it is generally defined as the 
rate at which tasks are completed.  It is unclear whether or not all speeded tasks tap into 
the same type of cognitive processes (e.g., attention), nor whether speed of processing is 
more a measure of the rate of input or output of information (Shanahan et al., 2006).  
Regardless of the difficulty in pinpointing a clear definition, processing speed appears to 
have a significant influence on the ability to effectively attend to stimuli and thus acquire 
new information.  The connection between processing speed and attention has been 
identified in research on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), noting 
impairment in processing speed in this population of children (see Shanahan, 2006 for a 
review).  Processing speed is thought to be mediated by subcortical and anterior brain 
regions (Anderson et al., 2006).   
Attention often falls under the broader heading of executive functioning, making 
the two concepts difficult to tease apart (Mirsky, Anthony, Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 
1991).  There is quite a bit of overlap among measures of attention and what is 
considered executive functioning, therefore typical measures of attention and measures of 
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executive functioning that rely on attention are often both examined within the same 
body of literature (Mirsky et al., 1991).  Executive aspects of attention are sometimes 
referred to as attentional control (Manly et al., 2001).  The three primary executive-level 
attention processes are: 1) response inhibition, which is the process of inhibiting 
automatic responses to specific stimuli; 2) divided attention, which is the ability to attend 
to multiple stimuli simultaneously; and 3) shifting attention, which is the ability to 
change the focus of attention easily from one stimulus to another.  These executive-level 
attention processes are thought to be mediated primarily by the frontal lobes (Anderson et 
al., 2006).   
Models of Attention 
Although individual researchers tend to argue that there are different attentional 
domains (such as those mentioned previously) the most widely accepted models suggest 
that the concept of attention can be divided into separate factors of attention (Heaton et 
al., 2001).  Most researchers agree that attention is mediated by a distributed neural 
network, made up of multiple anatomical regions (Mirsky et al., 1991; Posner & 
Petersen, 1990). The exact neural structures and the extent of their participation in the 
attention process, however, are greatly debated.   
Mirsky was one of the first researchers who attempted to establish cognitive 
constructs and behavioural outcomes related to specific brain regions (Koziol, Joyce, & 
Wurglitz, 2014). His original four-factor model of attention consisted of sustained 
attention, selective or focused attention, attention shift, and divided attention (Mirsky et 
al., 1991). Since his original investigations, numerous researchers have supported his 
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theory and conducted research within the four-factor model framework (e.g., Cooley & 
Morris, 1990; Sergeant & Van der Meer, 1990).    
In contrast, Posner originally proposed a dual-factor model of attention, controlled 
by different neuroanatomical regions, which are interconnected and directly influence 
one another.  Posner argued that one aspect of attention involved in the model was 
selective and shifting attention, which he suggested was controlled by the posterior 
cortical regions, most notably the parietal lobes.  The second aspect of attention was 
thought to be involved primarily in higher-order functions, which were controlled by the 
anterior system, including the prefrontal cortex (Posner & Petersen, 1990).   
More recently, researchers have argued for more complex models of attention, 
with multiple components that interact with one another.  Posner reconsidered his 
original attention model, suggesting a three-factor network that takes more of the 
subtleties of attentional processes into account.  Posner labeled the three factors: 
Orienting, Alerting, and Executive Attention.  Supporters of Posner’s three-factor model 
have identified variants of a similar structure (e.g., Manly et al., 2001; Anderson et al., 
2005; Anderson et al., 2006), labelling the three factors: 1) Focus/Select, 2) 
Sustain/Vigilance, and 3) Attentional Control/Switching/Shifting/Response 
Inhibition/Divide/Processing Speed.  
Kavros and colleagues (2008) compared and contrasted Posner’s three-factor and 
Mirsky’s four-factor models of attention and suggested that, despite some overlap in the 
neuroanatomical regions identified in the models, the researchers demonstrate very little 
agreement with respect to the types of attention involved in those regions.  The three- and 
four-factor models will be delineated further in the following paragraphs.   
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Posner’s Three-Factor Model of Attention.  Posner and Petersen (1990) first 
described attention as a network of separate neuroanatomical regions responsible for 
individual attention networks, which they derived from an overview of studies examining 
visual orientation, alertness and vigilance, as well as conscious signal detection in both 
animals and adults with typical cognitive processes and acquired injuries (see Posner & 
Petersen, 1990 for a review).  Posner’s most recent description of the attentional network 
model identifies three individual systems, described as Orienting, Alerting, and Executive 
attention.  Numerous studies have since followed, providing evidence in support of the 
theory, further defining the three factors of attention (e.g., Posner & Fan, 2008; Posner & 
Rothbart, 2007) and supporting the neuroanatomical correlates outlined by Posner, 
through fMRI findings (Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 2005).  In 
addition, researchers have examined these factors in a developmental context, suggesting 
that the attention networks rely on one another, with individual aspects of the attention 
network developing at different stages over time (see Posner & Rothbart, 2007 for a 
review).    
Given the theoretical nature of Posner’s model of attention, researchers have 
developed an experimental task called the Attention Network Test (ANT), which is a 
combination of a cue target and flanker test (based on Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974), and is 
used in experimental settings to examine the three attention networks using measures of 
reaction time (Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002).  The ANT has been 
developed for use with both adults and children (Fan et al., 2002; Rueda et al., 2004).  In 
clinical practice traditional neuropsychological assessment measures can be used to 
represent Posner’s three factors of attention.    
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Although the terms used by Posner have changed throughout various versions of 
the model, the theoretical basis of each factor has remained consistent over time.  In the 
most recent account of Posner’s model, the Orienting attention network is responsible for 
responding to changes in the perceptual field or sensory cues, by disengaging from a 
stimulus, shifting attention, and engaging in a new stimulus (Mezzacappa, 2004).  Posner 
(1980) suggested that these responses can either be overt or covert orientations to a 
stimulus, given that an individual can orient attention without overtly making eye 
movements towards the stimulus.  Orienting attention appears to be controlled by the 
frontal eye field, superior parietal lobe, temporoparietal junction, pulvinar, and the 
superior colliculus (Posner & Fan, 2008; Posner & Rothbart, 2007).   
In order to assess Posner’s Orienting attention, researchers have relied on 
neuropsychological tests requiring the individual to direct their attention to a cued 
location, such as cancellation tasks or the Trail Making Test (Kavros et al., 2008).  In the 
process of developing the Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch), Manly and 
colleagues (2001) determined that the Sky Search subtest correlates with the Trail 
Making Test, representing what the authors termed Focused or Selective attention, which 
maps onto Posner’s Orienting attention.   
Posner’s Alerting attention is considered the process of maintaining a state of 
vigilance or alert arousal during prolonged mental activity, which is mediated by the right 
prefrontal and lateral parietal regions, the locus coeruleus, and the thalamus (Posner & 
Fan, 2008; Posner & Raichle, 1994; Posner & Rothbart, 2007).  Mezzacappa (2004) 
further elaborates on Alerting attention, noting that it can also refer to a state of being 
prepared for effortful information processing.  In research, continuous performance and 
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vigilance tasks have been used to evaluate Posner’s Alerting attention network (Fan et al., 
2002).  As mentioned previously, Manly et al.’s (2001) Score! and Sky Search Dual Task 
(SSDT) subtests of the TEA-Ch represent factors of sustained attention that map onto 
Posner’s Alerting attention network.   
Posner’s Executive Attention network involves a variety of processes related to 
executing goal-directed behaviour, such as: planning; anticipating outcomes; selecting 
among competing responses (i.e., conflict resolution); initiating, monitoring, and 
maintaining behaviour; and interrupting or modifying behaviour (i.e., inhibiting 
unwanted responses; Mezzacappa, 2004; Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Rueda et al., 2004).  
The processes involved in Executive Attention are purported to be mediated by the 
anterior cingulate gyrus, the lateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the ventral 
tegmental area, as well as the basal ganglia (Posner & Rothbart, 2007; Posner & Raichle, 
1994).  Variations of the Stroop test have historically been used to assess conflict 
resolution in research; the Stroop test is therefore considered a test of Executive Attention 
(Posner & Rothbart, 2007). 
Mirsky’s Four-Factor Model of Attention.  Mirsky’s model of attention appears 
to be primarily based on an “evolutionary developmental perspective” (Kavros et al., 
2008, p. 1571); Mirsky considers the ability to attend to stimuli a skill that is consistent in 
all animals, and therefore particular neuroanatomical structures are considered to be 
responsible for aspects of attention across species (Mirsky et al., 1991).  The components 
of Mirsky’s theory were initially empirically-derived through factor analysis of 
neuropsychological test performance, compared to imaging data, in a typical sample of 
adults and individuals with a variety of neurological or psychiatric diagnoses (i.e., eating 
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disorder, epilepsy, schizophrenia, affective disorder, and head injury), as well as 
typically-developing elementary school children.  Mirsky’s model therefore provides a 
framework for conceptualizing attention that corresponds with more traditional measures 
of attention within clinical neuropsychology.  
Mirsky’s Focus/Execute is the process of maintaining attention to a particular 
stimulus despite distraction from competing stimuli, which has been recognized as a 
feature of processing speed, given the rapid response output component of the attentional 
process (Koziol et al., 2014).  The inferior parietal lobe and corpus striatum are 
considered to be responsible for both focusing and executing attention, whereas the 
superior temporal cortex is involved in focusing attention alone (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky et 
al., 1991).  Mirsky suggests that performance on the Coding and Digit- Symbol 
Substitution subtests from the Wechsler scales, the Trail Making Test (parts A and B), the 
Stroop test, and cancellation tests, are all mediated by the Focus/Execute process of 
attention (Mirsky, 1996).  Some investigators have used the Wechsler Symbol Search 
task as a measure of Focus/Execute (Koziol et al., 2014).   
Although the more complex version of the Trail Making Test (Trails B) is defined 
as a test of cognitive flexibility (see Appendix A for a description), and is traditionally 
clinically relied upon as a measure of executive functioning, Trails B did not load with 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) on Mirsky’s Shift factor in the original factor 
analysis (Mirsky et al., 1991).  Despite the executive component necessary to complete 
the task (i.e., switching between stimuli, inhibiting unwanted responses), when 
examining time to completion as the measure of interest, Trails B is more a test of 
speeded control of attention than shifting attention (Koziol et al., 2014). 
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Sustain represents the process of maintaining vigilance, which Mirsky describes 
as the ability to maintain focus and alertness over time.  Structures of the brainstem – 
including the tectum and mesopontine regions of the reticular formation – are suggested 
to be responsible for Sustain, along with thalamic nuclei.  These brainstem and thalamic 
regions are the more evolutionarily primitive of the brain structures, which explains why 
they are responsible for the most basic of the attention processes (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky 
et al., 1991).  In establishing the original model, Mirsky relied on subscales of the 
Continuous Performance Test (CPT; Rosvold & Delgado, 1956) to assess Sustain, 
including number of correct hits, number of commission errors, and reaction time.  In 
developing the TEA-Ch, Manly and colleagues (2001) identified several subtests that 
represent sustained attention, including Score! and Sky Search Dual Task (SSDT).   
Shift is described as the ability to move attention from one stimulus or part of a 
stimulus to another.  Mirsky and colleagues suggested that Shift is related to the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, based on Milner’s work (1963), as well as the medial 
frontal cortex and anterior cingulate gyrus, as evidenced through their animal models 
(Mirsky et al., 1991).  The WCST is relied on to assess Mirsky’s Shift factor (Mirsky, 
1996).  In their original model, Mirsky and colleagues included the number of categories 
successfully achieved, the numbers of errors made, and the number of correct responses 
(Mirsky, 1996) as indicators of attentional shifting.  Mirsky recognized that Shift is also a 
feature of executive functioning, acknowledging that there is no clearly defined 
distinction between attention and executive functioning (Mirsky, 1996).  
Encode is a process similar to the concept of working memory, involving the act 
of holding and manipulating information in mind (Mirsky, 1996).  Mirsky relied on the 
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Digit Span and Arithmetic subtests from the Wechsler scales to assess Encode.  In more 
recent research, investigators have relied on measures of immediate memory (e.g., 
sentence repetition, the first trial of a list-learning task, or immediate story recall) as 
measures of Mirsky’s Encode (Koziol & Budding, 2009).  Mirsky and his colleagues 
argued that the hippocampus and amygdala (both subcortical structures) are responsible 
for Encode, based on Scoville and Milner’s (1957) as well as Mishkin’s (1978) research 
demonstrating that these areas may be involved in the mnemonic or encoding aspects of 
language (Mirsky, 1996; Mirsky et al., 1991).  More recently Koziol et al. (2014) 
suggested that the neuroanatomical substrates of Encode are much more widespread in 
the brain than previously thought, and they make up a network that includes 
neuroanatomical structures connected through the Fronto-Parietal Network (FPN), 
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the anterior 
cingulate cortex, the cerebellum, and the medial occipital cortex.   
In a 1995 book chapter, Mirsky reported that he and his colleagues had identified 
a fifth factor of attention, which was referred to as Stability, and represented the 
consistency of responses to a target stimulus.  Mirsky suggested that this factor of 
attention was linked to Sustain, and the brain regions responsible for both factors likely 
overlapped.  Mirsky reported that this factor of attention could be assessed by examining 
an individual’s consistency of responses across trials of the CPT.  Although Stability is 
mentioned in subsequent articles written by Mirsky (e.g., Mirsky, Pascualvaca, Duncan, 
& French, 1999), there was no published research demonstrating how the fifth factor of 
attention was developed; references suggested that the work was made available through 
an unpublished dissertation.  Due to the limited availability of evidence supporting the 
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existence of the factor, and the fact that a single subtest was identified as a measure this 
type of attention, the current investigation will not consider the fifth factor of attention.  
From this point on, Mirsky’s original four-factor model of attention will be evaluated. 
Kavros et al. (2008) compared Mirsky’s and Posner’s models of attention.  They 
noted that there are only a few theoretical similarities between the two models: Mirsky’s 
Focus/Execute factor most closely resembles a combination of Posner’s Alerting and 
Orienting networks of attention.  Mirsky’s Shift appears to resemble the Orienting 
attention network described by Posner, given that Orienting refers primarily to the visual 
fields and shifting eye movements; however, Mirsky’s Shift also relates to shifting 
between concepts.  Kavros and colleagues reported limited overlap between Mirsky’s 
Encode and Sustain factors and Posner’s model of attention.  Overall, the researchers 
reported that the two theories take different theoretical approaches to classifying the 
underlying components of attention.   
Despite differences in opinion regarding the types of attention that exist, and to 
what extent attention overlaps with other cognitive processes, all theorists appear to be in 
agreement with the fact that attention is not a unitary cognitive ability (Stuss et al., 1995).  
Different aspects of attention are developed over time and interact with the mastery of 
other cognitive processes.  The age of a child at the time of the cerebral insult is a critical 
piece of information when considering how different cognitive abilities will be affected 
by a particular lesion. 
Developmental Theories of Attention.  In a review of the history of 
developmental neuropsychology, Morgan & Ricker (2008) suggested that first attempts at 
understanding paediatric neuropsychology focused on a top-down approach, using adult 
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models to help represent outcomes in children with acquired injuries.  The authors 
suggested that the push toward a “child-up” approach to studying paediatric 
neuropsychology has been a long time coming.  Research focusing on the factors of 
attention described previously suggests that individual components of attention vary in 
the rate at which they are first acquired and they are also mastered at different 
developmental stages.  Despite varying ages at which certain skills are acquired, children 
in general tend to show increases in the development of all aspects of attention between 
the ages of 8 to 10 years (McKay, Halperin, Schwartz, & Sharma, 1994).    
When examining the developmental aspects of Posner’s attention processes, 
Orienting attention appears to be one of the earliest attentional processes to develop and 
become established in children.  Infants as young as 3 to 4 months of age can be taught to 
orient to places in the environment, and this can be accomplished without moving their 
eyes (Colombo, 2004; Rothbart & Posner, 2001).  Typically, the ability to disengage, 
shift, and re-engage attention to a new stimulus is present by 6 to 9 months of age in most 
individuals (Colombo, 2004; Posner & Raichle, 1994).  Rueda et al. (2004) reported that 
Orienting attention continues to develop until 6 years of age when it can be considered 
mastered; however, voluntary orienting of attention (i.e., goal-directed behaviour) is 
argued to continue developing into adolescence (Posner & Raichle, 1994). Similarly, 
Rueda et al. (2004) found that Alerting attention is present by the age of 3 months, but 
suggested that this aspect of attention continues to develop into adolescence.   
On the other hand, Executive Attention appears to have a relatively late 
development.  Rueda et al. (2004) suggested that particular aspects of Executive 
Attention may be established at different points throughout an individual’s development.  
15 
 
For example, Rueda et al. (2004) found that conflict resolution begins to develop around 
2 to 4 years of age, and by the age of 10 years children obtain scores that are equivalent 
to those of adults.  Inhibition, on the other hand, does not appear to begin to develop until 
between 6 and 13 years.  Rueda et al. (2004) suggested that age 7 years is a reasonable 
cutoff for Executive Attention to be considered established overall.   
Researchers have investigated the development of some aspects of attention that 
are considered to be equivalent to Mirsky’s factors of attention.  Several aspects of 
attention fall under the general umbrella of Mirsky’s Focus/Execute factor; these 
processes have been investigated separately.  McKay et al. (1994) found that children 
tend to have early development of selective attention, and are able to master the skill by 
the age of 6 years.  Processing speed, on the other hand, tends to show a gradual 
development throughout childhood, increasing steadily with age (Anderson, Anderson, 
Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; McKay et al., 1994; Rueda et al., 2004).  
Richards (2004) found that children tend to master the process of sustaining 
attention within the first few months of infancy, and the skill appears to remain stable 
throughout childhood (McKay et al., 1994).  Rueda et al. (2004) found very little 
difference between children and adults in terms of their ability to shift attention between 
cues, but they noted that the ability to disengage from a particular stimulus improves with 
age.  Anderson et al. (2001) found that around the age of 15 years there is a “growth 
spurt” for attention control and processing speed, aspects of attention measured through 
tests of digit span (both forward and backward), which fall under Mirsky’s Encode factor.  
Despite the extensive research that has been conducted on factors of attention and 
attempts to understand how various attentional processes develop over time, there remain 
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significant discrepancies among models of attention.  In particular, there is a lack of 
consensus regarding whether attention can be conceptualized as a three-factor or a four-
factor model.  Identifying the factor structure of a model of attention that fits within a 
developmental framework would provide a valuable tool to understanding the clinical 
consequences of impairment to individual attentional processes, such as the outcomes of 
attention following paediatric stroke.   
Paediatric Stroke Overview 
A stroke is a cerebrovascular event characterized by a sudden disturbance of 
central nervous functioning caused by a disruption of blood supply in the brain.  Ischemic 
strokes occur when there is a disruption in the blood supply to a specific region of the 
brain that lasts long enough to cause an infarct (i.e., death of the tissue; Blumenfeld, 
2011).  Ischemic strokes can be further subdivided into arterial ischemic stroke (AIS) and 
cerebral sinovenous thrombosis (CSVT), depending on the location of the blockage 
(Blumenfeld, 2011); ischemic strokes are therefore a result of either an embolism or 
thrombosis (deVeber, MacGregor, Curtis, & Mayank, 2000).  The most common location 
of ischemic strokes in children is in the Middle Cerebral Artery (MCA), most often in the 
left cerebral hemisphere (Raju, Nelson, Ferriero, & Lynch, 2007).  Hemorrhagic strokes 
refer to death of tissue due to either intracerebral or subarachnoid bleeding (Amlie-
Lefond, Sébire, & Fullerton, 2008).   
Paediatric stroke is an umbrella term, encompassing all cerebrovascular events 
occurring from the prenatal period in utero to the age of 18 years.  The term perinatal 
stroke is used in literature to refer to a stroke that occurs during very early life.  
According to the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) 
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perinatal strokes occur between 28 weeks of gestation and 28 days of life after birth 
(Lynch, Hirtz, deVeber, & Nelson, 2002).  Although the terms perinatal stroke and 
neonatal stroke are often used interchangeably, by definition the term neonatal applies 
exclusively to events that occur after birth.  Because of the difficulty in reliably 
establishing the timing of stroke onset during the neonatal period, the term perinatal 
stroke is more encompassing and preferred by many authors (Amlie-Lefond et al., 2008).  
From this point forward, the term perinatal will be used to refer to the pre- and post-natal 
period, up to 28 days of life.   
The NINDS has determined that a stroke occurring between 29 days and 18 years 
of life is considered a childhood stroke (Lynch et al., 2002).  In the stroke literature, 
childhood strokes have been further subdivided into early childhood stroke (29 days to 5 
years) and late childhood stroke (5 to 18 years; Westmacott, Askalan, MacGregor, 
Anderson, deVeber, 2010). 
The clinical presentation of paediatric stroke tends to be quite subtle and has a 
wide range of possible symptoms (Lynch et al., 2002).   Often, signs of perinatal stroke 
do not become apparent until infants begin to move on their own and appear to favour 
one limb over another (Hartel, Schilling, Sperner, & Thyen, 2004).  When motor function 
is spared, symptoms may not present until later in childhood, when demands on a child’s 
complex cognitive skills are increased, such as language or problem-solving abilities 
(Westmacott et al., 2009).   
Prevalence  
Given recent advances in neuroimaging, the identification of childhood strokes 
has been increasing consistently since the 1970s.  The most recent estimates suggest that 
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approximately 5 to 8 in every 100 000 children will have a stroke, up to 50% of which 
are ischemic (Agrawal, Johnston, Wu, Sidney, & Fullerton, 2009; Lynch et al., 2002).  
Strokes are among the top 10 causes of death in children; the highest mortality rates due 
to stroke are among those under 1 year of age (Lynch et al., 2002).  Paediatric strokes are 
more likely to occur during the perinatal period than any other period throughout 
childhood; in fact, approximately 32% of paediatric AIS and 43% of paediatric CSVT 
occur within the first 28 days of life (deVeber et al., 2000; deVeber et al., 2001).  More 
than 50% of children who survive paediatric strokes subsequently develop motor 
difficulties (e.g., hemiparesis) and/or cognitive deficits (e.g., attention impairment; Lynch 
et al., 2002). 
The majority of the paediatric stroke literature has focused on ischemic strokes, 
partly since the neonatal brain is particularly vulnerable to damage as a result of ischemia 
(Lynch et al., 2002).  A recent review has suggested that between 39% and 54% of 
childhood strokes are hemorrhagic; although they remain an understudied half of the 
paediatric stroke population (Warren, 2011).  The current investigation will focus on 
ischemic strokes, exclusively examining patients with AIS, due to the greater availability 
of this population within the clinical sample.  
Causes 
Although the mortality rate in infants has been consistent over the past 40 years, 
the causes of paediatric strokes have changed over time (Lynch et al., 2002).  Prior to the 
influenza vaccination, this virus was a common cause of strokes in children.  More recent 
analyses suggest that the most common known causes of paediatric stroke include: 
congenital/acquired heart disease; sickle cell anemia; coagulation disorders; extracranial 
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carotid dissection; varicella or other similar infections; trauma; Down’s or Williams’ 
Syndromes; and a wide range of other viruses and bacteria (Lynch et al., 2002; Kirkham, 
1999).  Despite the wide range of possible causes of paediatric stroke, in more than one 
third of all cases, there is no evident source (Lynch et al., 2002).    
Sex Differences 
Paediatric strokes are more common in males than females, regardless of age at 
stroke, type of stroke, or history of trauma (Golomb, Fullerton, Nowak-Gottl, & deVeber, 
2009).  Westmacott et al. (2009) found that males with perinatal AIS showed a more 
significant cognitive impairment by the time they reached school age than a matched 
group of females, in terms of overall intellectual ability, nonverbal reasoning, and 
processing speed.  This finding suggests that not only are males more likely to suffer 
strokes, but they are more likely to experience emerging cognitive impairments 
throughout development.  The sex difference in cognitive outcomes may be explained by 
the relative immaturity of the male brain at birth, compared to the female brain; the male 
brain may thus be more susceptible to impairment following perinatal stroke (Westmacott 
et al., 2009).  See the following vulnerability theory explanation for an elaboration of this 
idea.   
Outcomes 
Vulnerability vs. Plasticity Theories.  An often debated question in paediatric 
neuropsychology is whether or not earlier damage results in better outcomes than later 
insult, given either the plasticity or vulnerability of the young brain.  Theories appear to 
fall along a spectrum; at one extreme is the theory of plasticity, which is the process by 
which neural circuitry is modified in response to environmental impact or experience 
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(Anderson, Spencer-Smith, & Wood, 2011).  Based on her research with infant and adult 
monkeys, Margaret Kennard (1938; 1942) suggested that functional reorganization of the 
brain is greater following early injury, due to the plasticity of the young brain.  She found 
that adult monkeys tended to show greater impairment than infant monkeys following 
comparable lesions (Kennard, 1938).  Researchers who support what has been dubbed the 
“Kennard Principle” argue that damage tends to be less severe and result in fewer 
functional impairments following a focal brain injury in younger children, compared to 
the results seen when the injury occurs in older children and adults.  Proponents of the 
theory of early brain plasticity suggest that the young brain may, in fact, be more 
malleable in early life and able to reorganize more effectively than an older brain 
(Anderson et al., 2005).  As a result, one would expect better recovery following early 
insult than might be seen in an older individual with that same injury.   
On the other end of the spectrum is the theory of vulnerability.  Hebb (1947) 
found that children with frontal lobe injuries had worse outcomes and greater functional 
impairment than adults following equivalent brain insult.  Hebb hypothesized that early 
cerebral insult might prevent the normal development of certain cognitive abilities, which 
may result in impairment within particular cognitive domains. Young children whose 
cognitive skills are not fully established at the time of insult may have trouble acquiring 
those skills and will experience poorer recovery (Biltigua et al., 2004; Giza & Prins, 
2006).   Some argue that younger brains are less mature and are underdeveloped; 
therefore the frontal regions and myelinated fibers in particular tend to be more 
vulnerable to damage than a mature adult brain (Hudspeth & Pribram, 1990).   
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Some proponents of the vulnerability theory have since suggested that there can 
be a cumulative effect of early cerebral insult, sometimes referred to as a “snowball 
effect” (McLinden, Baird, Westmacott, Anderson, & deVeber, 2007); not only do young 
children have a very limited set of acquired skills at the time of the early injury, but 
damage may also impair their ability to consolidate new skills in the future (Anderson, 
Catroppa, Morse, Haritou, & Rosenfeld, 2005).  Children with cerebral insults tend to 
struggle more with complex cognitive processes as the demands of recovery exacerbate 
the usual challenges of development (Dennis, 2000).   
Recent evidence in stroke literature tends to support the theory of vulnerability 
and age effects, demonstrating that the functional outcome of insult to a young brain may 
be disproportionately affected by strokes compared to a more mature brain (Hartel et al., 
2004), especially in respect to cognitive functioning.  For example, Hartel et al. (2004) 
found that children with paediatric strokes show a general trend toward having a weaker 
Performance Intelligence Quotient (PIQ) than Verbal Intelligence Quotient (VIQ) on 
Wechsler Intellectual Scales (i.e., WPSSI, WISC, and WAIS), and the discrepancy is 
significantly greater for children who have a stroke before the age of 5 years, during the 
period when the brain is still in the early stages of development, than for children who 
have an equivalent stroke after the age of 5 years. McLinden et al. (2007) found that 
when significant intellectual deficits are present, they can be identified as early as 12 to 
24 months post-stroke.  Not only is younger age at stroke associated with poorer scores 
on measures of intellectual functioning, but this trend is also present across a broad range 
of cognitive domains, including: memory, language, visuospatial skills, and academic 
functioning (Max, Bruce, Keatley, & Delis, 2010).   
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Based on their studies of rat models, Kolb, Gibb, and Gorny (2000) believe that 
there are “windows of opportunity” during which the best outcomes might occur 
following cerebral insult, due to specific developmental periods during which the greatest 
neural generation occurs.  Kolb and colleagues (2000) suggested that the most severe 
neurological deficits result from insults occurring during the perinatal period (i.e., the 
gestational period up to the first month of life), as is evidenced through cases of cerebral 
palsy; whereas the window for the best outcomes appears to be during the second year of 
life (i.e., between 12 and 24 months).   
In their research with paediatric stroke populations, Allman and Scott (2011) 
found that when examining performance across a range of neuropsychological tests, 
children who suffered a stroke between the ages of 1 to 6 years had relatively spared 
performance, compared to greater impairment for children with stroke onset before the 
age of 1 year or after the age of 6 years.  This finding is consistent with Kolb’s argument 
for critical periods of development, suggesting that both younger and older ages may be 
associated with greater risk of impairment across cognitive domains.   
Anderson et al. (2011) suggested that rather than choosing sides in the 
vulnerability vs. plasticity debate, these processes should be considered along a 
continuum of recovery potential, with plasticity and vulnerability as opposing processes 
at the extremes of the spectrum.  Anderson and her colleagues note that outcomes along 
this continuum likely depend on a variety of contributing factors, including: injury factors 
(e.g., age at injury, severity of insult); constitutional factors (e.g., genetic makeup, sex of 
the child); and environmental factors (e.g., social status, access to rehabilitation).  
Anderson et al. (2011; 2005) also suggest that early neural recovery does not always 
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translate into behavioural (or functional) recovery.  Behavioural recovery tends to differ 
depending on the complexity of the ability in question and is based on both the ability to 
implement compensatory strategies and the brain’s plasticity (i.e., its ability to 
reorganize).   
Neurological Outcomes.  Neurological impairment and seizures occur in 
approximately 50-75% of children with ischemic strokes (including both AIS and CSVT; 
Raju et al., 2007).  deVeber et al. (2000) found that over 41% of children with ischemic 
strokes demonstrated moderate to severe deficits on neurological outcome measures.  
Children with AIS tended to have worse outcomes than those with CSVT; “poor 
outcome” was found in 46% of children with AIS and 18% with CSVT.  deVeber et al. 
(2000) also found that unilateral sensorimotor deficits were present in 57% of children 
with AIS and 18% with CSVT.  Speech, behavioural, and cognitive deficits, on the other 
hand, were less common, only present in 15% of children with AIS and 11% with CSVT.   
Seizures are a common symptom of ischemic stroke (Chabrier, Husson, 
Dinomais, Landrieu, & Nguyen The Tich, 2011; Kirkham, 1999).  When children show 
signs of an early onset stroke (i.e., within the first 28 days of life), they are most likely to 
present with seizures (Chabrier et al., 2011).  Children who suffer from seizures 
associated with early cerebral insult are more likely to have cognitive impairment, and 
these deficits are likely to be more severe than in children with paediatric stroke who do 
not experience recurring seizures, due to secondary functional impairments (Hartel et al., 
2004; Murias, Brooks, Kirton, & Iaria, 2014).  For this reason, children with recurring 
seizures are often excluded in research investigating the outcomes of paediatric strokes 
(e.g., Westmacott et al.).    
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Motor Outcomes.  Hemiparesis is the most common clinical symptom of 
unilateral stroke (Hogan, Kirkham, & Isaacs, 2000), and is often the first sign of stroke in 
children who do not present with seizures (Kirkham, 1999).  Most strokes occur in 
regions of the brain where sensorimotor systems are represented, and therefore motor 
difficulties are common and quite variable in paediatric stroke cases; symptoms may 
include abnormal reflexes, tone asymmetry, action tremors, hemiparesis, and hemiplegia 
(Hogan et al., 2000).  Paresis (motor weakness) tends to be the most prevalent and 
distressing motor outcome following paediatric stroke, especially in the perinatal stroke 
group (Hartel et al., 2004); hemiparesis occurs in approximately 30% of children 
following paediatric strokes (Ricci et al., 2008).   
Cognitive Outcomes.  There have been mixed results in the research attempting 
to determine the extent to which children demonstrate cognitive impairment following 
paediatric stroke (Hartel et al., 2004).  Westmacott et al. (2009) found that children who 
had unilateral AIS during the perinatal period were more likely to demonstrate 
impairment in higher-level cognitive skills once they reached school age, even if they 
showed no deficits during the toddler or preschool years.  This finding suggests that 
children with perinatal strokes tend to make slower cognitive gains than typically-
developing children.  Alternatively, Ricci et al. (2008) found that children with perinatal 
middle cerebral artery (MCA) strokes tended to have average IQ by their preschool years, 
as long as they did not present with additional confounding features (e.g., parent with 
cognitive impairment, developmental delays, etc.), which predisposed them to greater 
cognitive impairment following paediatric stroke.   
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Perhaps the discrepancies in results among studies can be related to the 
populations being compared; children with paediatric stroke may not perform in a 
significantly impaired range, but tend to show a lag in cognitive development, when 
compared to the average child.  In a large sample of children with unilateral AIS, 
Westmacott et al. (2010) found that despite falling within the average range on all 
subscales of the WISC, children with strokes had significantly lower scores overall when 
compared to a normative group of children.   
The global cognitive deficits present in children with paediatric stroke are quite a 
contrast to the common consequences of strokes that occur later in life.  Adults who 
suffer strokes tend to experience very specific high-level cognitive impairments 
following focal lesions.  These most commonly include aphasia (language impairment), 
amnesia (memory impairment), or apraxia (movement impairment; Vargha-Khadem, 
Isaacs, & Muter, 1994).  For example, in adults, speech/language impairments are 
common following unilateral strokes localized to the left medial temporal lobe; however, 
studies have consistently shown that children do not have the same pattern of deficits 
following unilateral lesions (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1994; Mosch, Max, & Tranel, 2005).  
In fact, researchers have found that there are no significant effects of lesion laterality in 
cognitive outcomes following paediatric stroke (e.g., Hetherington, Tuff, Anderson, 
Miles, & deVeber, 2005; Hogan, Kirkham, & Isaacs, 2000; Westmacott et al., 2010).   
Children who have strokes tend to present with more generalized cognitive 
impairments than adults with strokes to similar locations, who present with quite 
localized impairments.  Vargha-Khadem et al. (1994) reported that the consequences of 
childhood strokes tend to be more widespread within the brain than similar injuries in 
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adults, which explains the lack of localized impairment.  Vargha-Khadem and colleagues 
(1994) suggested that there are two possible – yet opposing – explanations to support the 
idea that insult tends to be less focal in children.  The first is that damage to a particular 
region can result in a decrease in potential for the acquisition of abilities within fully 
intact associated regions, when the relationship between the two regions is necessary for 
learning.  This first explanation is consistent with the vulnerability theory, and would 
suggest that early cerebral damage results in more global deficits.  A second explanation 
offered by Vargha-Khadem et al. (1994) is that the effects of focal lesions is less 
pronounced in children due to the plasticity of the early developing brain, which can 
compensate for the damaged regions and preserve function. The second explanation is 
consistent with the plasticity theory, and would suggest that early cerebral damage results 
in greater overall preservation of function across skills.  
Not only do outcomes vary based on the age at which the stroke occurred, but the 
location of lesions plays a role in the outcomes as well.  Westmacott et al. (2010) found 
that children with strokes affecting both cortical and subcortical regions of the brain had 
poorer scores on IQ measures (WISC-III/-IV) than children with strokes occurring only 
in either the cortical or the subcortical region.  The researchers also noted that age of 
stroke significantly affected performance on the WISC; however, this effect was 
influenced by the location of the lesion.  The children with earliest stroke onset (i.e., prior 
to one month of age) had the poorest outcomes when the lesions were localized to the 
subcortical regions; while children with strokes that occurred between the ages of 1 
month and 5 years had the worst outcomes when their lesions involved only cortical 
regions.  In addition, the impact of lesion location and age at stroke depend on the 
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cognitive domain being measured; for example, children tended to have greater 
impairment in academic functioning following stroke than adults, while there was no 
difference between the two groups in terms of memory ability (Mosch, Max, & Tranel, 
2005).   
The severity of lesions also plays a role in the outcome measures of paediatric 
cerebral insult.  Anderson, Jacobs, et al. (2005) found that for mild and moderate 
childhood traumatic brain injury (TBI), sustained between 3 and 12 years of age, children 
made significant recovery within the first 12 months post-injury.  For more severe 
injuries, children with earlier insult (i.e., age 3-7 years) made poorer gains than children 
who had suffered similar injuries later in childhood (i.e., 8-12 years; Anderson, Jacobs, et 
al., 2005). There appears to be a “double hazard” effect of the combination of severe 
injury and younger age leading to the poorest outcomes (Anderson, Catroppa, et al., 
2005).  Similarly, paediatric stroke research has noted lesion severity as a contributing 
factor of poorer cognitive outcome (e.g., Banich, Levine, Kim, & Huttenlocher, 1990).  
However, conclusions based on TBI research may not be generalizable to stroke patients, 
due to the less focal nature of TBI compared to stroke. 
Behavioural and Emotional Outcomes.  There have been conflicting results in 
research related to the behavioural and emotional consequences of paediatric stroke (see 
Hartel et al., 2004 for a review).  Children do not tend to show behavioural outcomes 
similar to those demonstrated in adults with unilateral cerebral insults, such as deficits in 
emotional expression following right hemisphere injury or increased risk for depression 
following left cerebral insult (Hartel et al., 2004).  Some studies have identified 
impairment in social skills, emotional expression, irritability, and hyperactivity in 
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children with a history of stroke (Hartel et al., 2004).   However, interpreting these 
findings is complicated by research demonstrating the impact of psychosocial factors on 
behavioural outcomes.  Laucht et al. (2000) demonstrated that children with behavioural 
consequences following early cerebral insults in general (e.g., aggression, delinquency, 
etc.), tend to also have negative psychosocial risk factors such as early family adversity 
present at birth (e.g., maternal depression).  These psychosocial adversities into which 
children are born tend to outweigh any influence that early cerebral insult will have on 
behavioural consequences (Laucht et al., 2000). 
Max et al. (2002b) found that children who have had a stroke are at greater risk 
for experiencing a comorbid psychiatric disorder, even when controlling for a variety of 
related factors, such as: age, gender, socioeconomic status, race, family functioning, 
family history of psychiatric disorder, and comorbid medical conditions.  The researchers 
found that protective factors included: average intellectual functioning of the child; a 
typical neurological exam (i.e., no comorbid seizures, hemiparesis, coordination 
difficulty, etc.); and a limited family psychiatric history (Max et al., 2002b).  
Although there appears to be a general consensus within the adult literature about 
the outcomes following localized infarcts, there is no clear understanding of how a 
child’s brain is affected by a stroke.  There is continued debate over whether the young 
brain is more susceptible to injury than an older brain (i.e., vulnerability theory) or is 
more available for reorganization and preservation of function (i.e., plasticity theory), 
given the varying outcomes that have been identified in children following early acquired 
brain injuries.  Throughout the literature, the consensus appears to be that neurological, 
motor, cognitive, behavioural, and emotional outcomes are influenced by a wide range of 
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factors, including the timing, severity, and location of the lesion, as well as comorbid 
medical conditions and psychosocial risk factors.  
Attention Deficits Following Paediatric Stroke 
Despite the wide range of possible neurological, behavioural, and emotional 
outcomes that may result from paediatric strokes, an area of increasing interest in the 
field has been on the impact that cerebrovascular insults have on cognitive abilities, and 
attention, in particular.  In the past decade, researchers have highlighted a specific need 
for more a comprehensive neuropsychological profile to be developed – including a more 
in-depth assessment of cognitive functioning – following paediatric strokes (Max et al., 
2005).  Researchers have identified attention disturbances in paediatric stroke patients, 
across a variety of different investigative approaches.  In the past, researchers have 
examined individual cognitive measures, to assess outcomes of attention following 
paediatric stroke.  Aram & Ekelman (1986) found that task persistence on the Freedom 
From Distractibility index of the WISC-R (i.e., the sum of scores on the arithmetic and 
digit span subtests) was impaired following right-sided focal lesions.  Block, Nanson, & 
Lowry (1999) found divided attention impairment on the Symbol-Digit Modalities Test 
for children with left-sided focal lesions.   
Max et al. (2004) examined performance on the Starry Night task (Rizzo & 
Robin, 1990), a test designed specifically to tap into Posner’s factors of Orienting and 
Alerting attention.  The researchers found impairment on this test for individuals who had 
focal lesions to the Orienting or Alerting network regions identified by Posner, while no 
significant impairment was found on this test for children with lesions of the Executive 
Attention network (Max et al., 2004).  MRI findings were relied on to pinpoint the 
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Orienting network (bilateral parietal lobes, bilateral thalamus, and bilateral precentral 
gyri), the Alerting network (right inferior parietal lobe, right precentral and superior 
frontal gyri, and right thalamus), and the Executive Attention network (bilateral anterior 
cingulum, posterior cingulum, superior frontal gyrus, paracentral lobule, caudate, 
lentiform, and claustrum).  In this investigation, attention deficits tended to be more 
severe for children identified in the early stroke group (i.e., onset of stroke before 12 
months of age) compared to the late stroke group (i.e., onset at 12 months of age or 
older), regardless of the size of the lesion (Max et al., 2004).   
Although some researchers have examined specific cognitive measures of 
attention (Aram & Ekelman, 1986; Block et al., 1999; Max et al., 2004), a common 
research approach in this area of study is to focus on behavioural measures of attention, 
such as those consistent with Attention Deficit (Hyperactivity) Disorder (ADD/ADHD).  
Given the limited consistency in terms of the measurement tools used in attention 
research, there tends to be some confusion over the definition of attention within the 
literature (see Kavros et al., 2008 for a review).  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) definition 
of ADD/ADHD states that an individual has symptoms of inattention (e.g., makes 
careless mistakes, is easily distracted, has difficulty sustaining attention) and/or 
hyperactivity-impulsivity (e.g., fidgets, talks excessively, interrupts) that are present prior 
to the age of 12 years and that occur in two or more settings (e.g., school, home, work).  
This disorder is usually diagnosed through parent or teacher report.   
A common behavioural questionnaire used to make a diagnosis of ADD/ADHD is 
the Conners (3
rd
 ed.; Conners 3; Conners, 2008).  Other measures of behaviour that can 
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contribute to a differential diagnosis of ADHD include: the Behavioural Rating Inventory 
of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000), a measure 
designed to assess executive function behaviours, which includes measures of 
behavioural regulation and metacognition; and the Behaviour Assessment System for 
Children, Second Edition (BASC-2; Reynolds & Kamphaus, 2004), a measure designed 
to assist in differential diagnoses of disorders (i.e., ADHD, Depression, etc.) that includes 
internalizing and externalizing behaviour scales.   
In their research, Max and his colleagues have investigated ADD/ADHD 
symptoms in relation to lesions acquired specifically to brain regions identified in 
Posner’s Executive Attention network.  Max et al. (2002a) found behavioural expression 
of attention deficits and symptoms consistent with ADHD in paediatric stroke patients 
with lesions of the putamen.  In a later study, Max et al. (2005) found similar outcomes in 
children with stroke lesions localized to the mesial prefrontal and orbital frontal regions.   
A concern with focusing on post-stroke ADD/ADHD symptoms is that cognitive 
test batteries are not designed to assess the behaviours required for a diagnosis of 
ADD/ADHD, nor are they specific to any one behavioural disorder; therefore, 
neuropsychological tests are not recommended as diagnostic tools for identifying 
ADD/ADHD (Swanson et al., 2004).  Children diagnosed with ADD/ADHD tend not to 
show deficits on standardized cognitive measures of inhibition or other executive 
functioning measures (Shanahan et al., 2006).  In fact, criteria in the DSM-5 for 
diagnosing ADD/ADHD are based on behavioural impairment, as observed by parents, 
teachers, or the clinician, and not on any cognitive measures of attention/executive 
functions.  As Kavros et al. (2008) state, ADD/ADHD “is a subjective report of observed 
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behavior...  it is not synonymous with attention impairment” (p. 1571).  Children with 
strokes who are involved in studies of attention are therefore being labelled with 
ADD/ADHD-type symptoms based on their scores on behavioural self-report measures 
and observation; cognitive attention impairments are not being taken into account.  Given 
that attention impairments identified through cognitive testing have consistently been 
reported for children with other acquired cerebral insults (e.g., Anderson et al., 2005; 
Anderson et al., 2006; Catroppa, Anderson, & Stargatt, 1999), it is important to turn the 
focus of research towards test-based measures of attention.   
Despite the extensive research conducted over the years, aiming to provide a 
better understanding of attentional processes, the current literature lacks a consistent 
model through which to understand the development of the attention network.  Given the 
nature of paediatric strokes, such that the timing of an insult can often be pinpointed, 
children with strokes make up a valuable population for research; children with a history 
of stroke can be relied on to investigate the development of attention over time, by 
examining the consequences of cerebrovascular injuries at various stages in development.  
Purpose of the Current Investigation 
Given that there is no universally-accepted model of attention in the cognitive 
literature, the purpose of the present investigation was to determine whether a three-
factor or a four-factor model of attention is best represented by a sample of children with 
arterial ischemic stroke (AIS).  Neuropsychological assessment measures of attention are 
included in the current investigation, chosen based on their presence in the original 
models of attention being compared, as well as their psychometric properties, with regard 
to the aspects of attention each test is purported to measure.  In addition, developmental 
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aspects of the model of attention will be examined, taking into account how a child’s age 
at the time of their stroke (Age at Stroke) and age at the time that they were assessed 
(Age at Testing) can be used as predictors of outcome on the factors of attention in the 
model of choice.   
Goals  
1. To determine whether a three-factor or four-factor model of attention best 
represented attentional processes in children from a clinical sample of arterial 
ischemic stroke (AIS).  To fulfill the primary goal of this investigation, the 
factors of attention confirmed by factor analysis were used to determine which 
theory of attention best described outcomes following paediatric AIS.  It was 
expected that if a three-factor model of attention best describes attention in the 
clinical sample, the data would fit well in a model with three major factors of 
attention that correspond with the following types of attention: 1) Orient/Select; 
2) Alert/Sustain/Vigilance; and 3) Executive Attention.  If a four-factor model of 
attention best describes attention in the clinical sample, the data was expected to 
fit well in a model with four major factors of attention that correspond with the 
following types of attention: 1) Focus/Execute; 2) Sustain; 3) Shift; and 4) 
Encode.   
2. To determine whether Age at Stroke or Age at Testing are significant predictors 
of outcome on factors of attention, based on the model selected in Goal #1.  To 
fulfill the second goal, a full latent variable model was developed based on the 
chosen model from Goal #1.  Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were included in 
the model as predictors of outcome on the factors of attention in separate 
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regression models.  In addition, Age at Stroke was included as a predictor of 
outcomes on factors of attention when Age at Testing was controlled for.  Age at 
Testing was subsequently included as a predictor of outcomes on factors of 
attention when Age at Stroke was controlled for.   
CHAPTER 2 
General Methods 
Participants 
All data were collected retrospectively.  Participants were selected from the 
Children’s Stroke Outcome Study sample at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto, 
Ontario.  This study was approved by the Research Ethics Board at the Hospital for Sick 
Children and, at the time of testing, consent was obtained from all participants or their 
caregivers for clinical data to be used in future research.  All children being treated by the 
Paediatric Stroke Clinic who are referred for a neuropsychological assessment are asked 
to participate in the ongoing outcome study.   
Participants who met inclusion criteria for the current investigation were born 
between 1977 and 2006, with a history of stroke diagnosed before the age of 18 years, 
who had received at least one of the measures of interest, including an intelligence test, 
before the age of 25 years.  For a graphical representation of Age at Stroke across 
participants in the current investigation, see Appendix B.  A breakdown of Age at Stroke 
across the tests of interest can be found in Appendix C.  Data from 291 children who 
were tested on or before October 2011 were originally collected from the database.  
Children with hemorrhagic or cerebral sinovenous thrombosis (CSVT) were excluded 
from the present investigation due to the relative scarcity within the given sample, and 
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potential for differing clinical presentation.  Based on radiographic report, an event was 
classified as AIS by an experienced paediatric neurologist if definite evidence of vascular 
focal infarction was present. In an attempt to limit the extent to which a combination of 
neurological conditions might influence the outcomes on measures of attention, children 
with comorbid disorders were excluded from the study.  Exclusion criteria included the 
presence of: preterm birth (<36 weeks gestation), moyamoya disease, sickle cell disease, 
CNS vasculitis, Down Syndrome, and recurrent seizures.  As a result, 196 children (126 
male, 70 female) met inclusion criteria for the current investigation and remained in the 
sample for study.  See Table 1 for a description of the patient demographics.    
 
Table 1 
Patient Demographics 
  
Demographics 
  
All 
Participants 
Perinatal 
Stroke 
Early Childhood 
Stroke 
Late Childhood 
Stroke 
Number of Participants 196 58 75 63 
Males/Females 126/70 36/22 46/29 44/19 
IQ
 a
 91.58 85.93 93.38 94.33 
Age at Stroke 4.66 0.0018 2.80 11.16 
Age at Testing 11.51 9.71 10.18 14.74 
Time since Stroke 6.85 9.71 7.38 3.58 
¹ Perinatal Stroke: before 28 days of life; Early Childhood Stroke: between 29 days and 5 
years of life; Late Childhood Stroke: after 5 years of life. 
² Age/Time: mean number of years.  
a 
Mean Full Scale IQ 
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Procedures 
The data used in this model are archival.  The primary investigator was involved 
in the data collection for some of the children included in the study, while administering 
neuropsychological assessments during a clinical practicum placement in the Paediatric 
Stroke Clinic at the Hospital for Sick Children.  The remaining data were accessed 
through an archival database, collected by other clinical researchers in the same clinic.   
Test Administration.  During the initial neuropsychological assessment, 
demographic and neurological characteristics of the children were determined based on a 
review of health records (including MRI reports), questionnaires completed by parents 
prior to the assessment, and structured parent interviews.  The neuropsychological 
assessments took place at the Hospital for Sick Children, and were administered either by 
a clinical neuropsychologist, a supervised psychometrist, or a supervised student.  In the 
Paediatric Stroke Clinic there are different core test batteries depending on the age of the 
child (4-5-year-olds; 6-16-year-olds; or 17-year-olds and up), based on the norms 
available for particular age ranges.  Often, tests are omitted or added to the core test 
batteries, given the discretion of the clinical neuropsychologist, based on a child’s 
limitations or a particular clinical referral question.  All participants and/or caregivers 
were provided with a full neuropsychological assessment report with recommendations.  
The clinical neuropsychologist conducted feedback sessions with the participants and/or 
caregivers following all assessments.   
Sampling Procedures.  Several children in the study were assessed through the 
Paediatric Stroke Clinic on multiple occasions.  In general, children tend to be assessed 
every 2 to 5 years, depending on the individual clinical question (Kitchen et al., 2012).  
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Whenever possible, assessments were scheduled at times of academic transition (e.g., 
beginning elementary school, beginning high school, or preparing for post-secondary 
life), when children will benefit most from the identification or reassessment of 
accommodations and supports.   
In the current investigation, scores from the most recent assessment were selected 
for participants with multiple test sessions, based on the precedent set by previous stroke 
research (e.g., Kitchen et al., 2012).  Selecting the test data most remote from the acute 
stroke increases the probability that children have reached their potential for recovery, 
and therefore relies on the most stable scores.  In addition, given that children tend to 
show greater cognitive deficits as they get older even if their abilities appear relatively 
spared during toddler or preschool years (Westmacott et al., 2009), it is important to 
assess attention later in development.  Assessments of children during the acute stages of 
post-stroke recovery may either reflect impairments that are likely to improve with time 
or fail to identify impairments in skills that have yet to begin developing (Anderson et al., 
2011).  For a graphical representation of Age at Testing across participants, see Appendix 
D.  A breakdown of Age at Testing across tests of interest can be found in Appendix E.  
Mean time since stroke was 6.85 years and ranged from less than one month to 17.44 
years.  A breakdown of Time since Stroke across tests of interest can be found in 
Appendix F.       
Materials 
The following cognitive measures of attention were included in the current 
investigation: Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS: Colour-Word 
Interference, Trail Making Test); Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch;  Sky 
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Search (SS), Score!, and Sky Search Dual Task (SS DT); Trail Making Test (Trails A and 
Trails B); Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV) and 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, WISC-IV), including Digit Span, 
Coding, and Letter-Number Sequencing subtests, when available; and Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST).  See Appendix A for complete descriptions of the tests 
investigated in the current study and rationale for their inclusion as a measure of 
attention.  See Appendix G for descriptive statistics of each test of attention.  
CHAPTER 3 
Statistical Analyses 
Analysis of Missing Data 
According to Narhi, Laaksonen, Hietala, Ahonen, and Lyvti (2001), there is a 
significant challenge when attempting to use data collected during clinical assessment for 
research purposes.  Inherently, clinical testing has a different purpose than collecting data 
for research.  In a clinical setting, test measures were added or removed from an 
assessment battery, based on the individual’s presenting concerns and needs, whereas for 
research purposes (in the case of a prospective study) fixed batteries are administered.  
For this reason, data collected in a clinical setting and used in a retrospective study (as is 
the case in the current investigation) will likely be affected by missing data.  Simply 
eliminating cases with missing data will reduce the statistical power (Narhi et al., 2001; 
McCleary, 2002); therefore, as long as there is a reasonable amount of data present in the 
sample, methods of estimation can be used to determine relationships in the data.  
Unfortunately, there are no set standards for the amount of missing data that is acceptable 
in a given data set (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007).   
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In the present investigation, an Analysis of Missing Data was conducted after 
eliminating any individuals who were missing 100% of the data of interest.  Of the 
remaining 196 participants who met the inclusion criteria outlined in the participants 
section above, 165 had missing data, with an average of 38% missing data overall within 
the sample.  Individual tests may not have been administered to any particular child in 
this sample for a variety of reasons, including age cutoffs in the norms, time restrictions 
during testing, or specific referral questions that dictated the test battery.  Little’s Missing 
Completely at Random (MCAR) test was statistically nonsignificant (Χ² [505] = 533.50, 
p = .184), suggesting that the data appear to be missing at random.  Note that because the 
reasons for the missing data are known, data cannot be considered missing completely at 
random, despite Little’s MCAR value being significant.  Rather, data can be considered 
statistically missing at random (MAR), suggesting that there is no predictable pattern of 
missingness that might influence the outcome of the results.   
Dealing with Missing Data: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
There has been a recent interest in relying on statistical software that estimates 
means and variances of a dataset based on the underlying pattern of missing data.  In 
structural equation modeling, the most widely used statistical criterion is the maximum 
likelihood (ML) algorithm (Byrne, 2010).  ML is the statistical process of identifying 
parameter estimates, by determining estimates that maximize the likelihood that the 
sample data are from a normal population.  All of the estimates are calculated 
simultaneously; therefore, the estimation process is considered to be a full-information 
method, and is also referred to as Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML; Kline, 
2005). 
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The AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structure) software relies on the ML approach 
to deal with missing data in modelling.  Mueller and Hancock (2010) provide a rule of 
thumb for using ML, which suggests that there should be at least five cases per model 
parameter for ML to be considered trustworthy.  Given that the current sample had a 
maximum of 39 model parameters in the confirmatory factor analyses for Goal #1, the 
sample of 196 participants was considered reasonable.  When conducting the full latent 
variable models for Goal #2, there were 50 parameters for the sample of 196 participants, 
resulting in limited power of the models.   
Testing Assumptions 
Normality.  Analyses of skewness and kurtosis in SPSS demonstrated that WCST 
Errors, Trails A, and Trails B tests had non-normal data.  Outliers from WCST were 
removed, which provided a normal distribution for the WCST Errors test.  The ranges of 
standardized scores were restricted for Trails A and B using the winsorization method, 
which resulted in a normal distribution of data.  Normality of the sample of children was 
assessed, based on factors of Age at Stroke and Age at Testing.  The distribution of Age 
at Stroke is positively skewed, such that 38% of children in the sample had strokes before 
the age of 1 year (see Appendix B), while the distribution of Age at Testing is normal 
(see Appendix D).  These factors need to be taken into consideration when making 
inferences about the effects of the predictors on the outcome variables.  
Multicollinearity.  The correlations among all variables of interest in the model 
were calculated.  Although Tabachnik and Fidell (2001) consider a correlation above r = 
.90 to be a sign of multicollinearity between two variables, Meyers, Gamst, and Guarino 
(2006) caution against including variables with a correlation above r = .80.  Because the 
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WCST Numbers of Errors and Number of Perseverative Errors variables were above the 
recommended cutoff (r = .859), there was concern about the possibility of 
multicollinearity in the model.  As a result, the WCST Perseverative Errors variable was 
not included in the analysis; instead, only the WCST Number of Errors variable 
(standardized score) and the Number of Categories variable (raw score) were analysed; 
these variables had a more reasonable correlation (r = .766).  None of the other 
independent variables were correlated above the r = .80 cutoff.  
Severity of Injury 
 In order to examine the severity of impairment across ages, a Pearson correlation 
was conducted between the Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) scores and three age factors (Age at 
Stroke, Age at Testing, and Time since Stroke).  Of the 196 children in the sample, 41 
had FSIQ scores below the average range (in the Borderline to Extremely Low ranges), 
while 27 of the children had FSIQ scores above the average range (ranging from High 
Average to Very Superior).  Results of the Pearson correlation suggested that there was 
not a significant correlation between FSIQ and Age at Stroke (r = .149, ns), nor was there 
a significant correlation between FSIQ and Age at Testing (r = -.102, ns).  There was, 
however, a significant correlation between FSIQ and Time since Stroke (r = -.276, p 
=.000).  
The findings of this analysis of severity suggest that the longer the time since a 
child’s stroke, at their most recent testing, the lower their FSIQ tends to be.  The negative 
correlation exists despite a lack of significant relationship between severity and Age at 
Stroke as well as severity and Age at Testing.  This finding provides support for the 
theory that children tend to grow into their impairments.  Despite potential gains in raw 
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scores on the IQ tests as the children develop, they may demonstrate a decrease in 
standardized scores over time as the gap in development of skills increases between the 
child and his or her peers.  In the subsequent analyses, the relationship between FSIQ and 
Time since Stroke was taken into consideration.  
  In addition to examining the relationship with FSIQ, a Pearson correlation was 
conducted between an overall Attention Composite and three age factors (i.e., Age at 
Stroke, Age at Testing, and Time since Stroke).  The Attention Composite was calculated 
by taking the mean standardized score for each of the tests of attention.  Of the 196 
participants included in the sample, 16 children had an Attention Composite score in the 
Mildly to Moderately impaired range (z < -1.0).   
Once an overall Attention Composite was determined for each child, the scores 
were correlated with the three age factors.  There was no significant correlation between 
the Attention Composite and Age at Stroke (r = .119, ns), nor was there a significant 
correlation between the Attention Composite and Age at Testing (r = -.045, ns).  There 
was, however, a significant negative correlation between the Attention Composite and 
Time since Stroke (r = -.194, p =.008).  Once again, this finding appears to support the 
theory that children tend to grow into their impairments, such that a child’s overall 
attention abilities may continue to decrease the longer it has been since the child’s stroke.   
CHAPTER 4 
Goal #1: Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Method 
The first goal of the investigation was to identify whether a three- or four-factor 
model of attention best fit a sample of children with AIS.  Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
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(CFA) was used to test the fit of the models, using the AMOS software.  The first step in 
the analysis was to test the validity of the two measurement models, prior to evaluating 
the structural model.  CFA was used to test the validity of the factors under consideration, 
determining the extent to which observed variables (i.e., performance on tests of interest) 
represent the underlying factors under consideration (Byrne, 2010).  Once a model was 
identified, the next step in the process of assessing model fit was to examine the 
significance of the parameter estimates.  In order for the model to the considered properly 
specified, the nonsignificant paths of the parameters were removed prior to determining 
fit (based on Byrne, 2010).  
Byrne outlined the most important goodness-of-fit statistics as: CMIN/DF (< 3.0 
= good fit); NFI (between 0-1 is good fit); CFI (> .95 is good fit, .80-.95 is reasonable 
fit); RMSEA (< .05 is good fit, .05-.10 is reasonable fit, > .10 is bad fit); and PCLOSE (> 
.05 is good fit).  Ideally, the probability of the model will be nonsignificant (p > .05); 
however, this is a rare occurrence with a relatively large sample size (Byrne, 2010).  
In order to replicate the three- and four-factor models of attention, a combination 
of tests used in the development of the original models were considered.  In order to 
represent Mirsky’s model of attention, the tests used in Mirsky’s (1991) original factor 
analysis were included (see Appendix H for a list of Mirsky’s original factors).  For the 
tests that were not available in the present sample, assessment measures deemed to be 
theoretically equivalent (based on the test descriptions outlined in Appendix A) were 
selected for analysis.  See the Introduction subheading entitled Mirsky’s Four-Factor 
Model of Attention (p. 9) for a discussion of the original tests used, as well as 
theoretically equivalent tests that have been more recently developed.   A set of tests were 
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also selected  to represent aspects of attention outlined in Posner’s model (based on 
descriptions by Posner & Rothbart, 2007, and Manly et al., 2001).  See the Introduction 
subheading entitled Posner’s Three-Factor Model of Attention (p. 6) for a discussion of 
the tests purported to measure aspects of Posner’s attention.   
In the current study, all tests of interest were combined in the factor analyses.  
The final tests of attention included in the present study were: Trail Making Test A 
(Trails A) and Trail Making Test B (Trails B), Stroop Inhibition test (Stroop), Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test Number of Errors variable (WCST Errors) and Number of Categories 
variable (WCST Categories), Coding, Digit Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Test of 
Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) Sky Search Attention (SS), Sky Search Dual 
Task (SS DT), and Score! subtests.   
Results 
Three-factor model of attention. In an attempt to best replicate the three-factor 
model of attention described by Posner, three iterations of the model were analyzed, 
ultimately maximizing the fit.  When the originally selected tests of attention were first 
analyzed (see Table 2), the model was not identified, due to a Heywood Case (i.e., 
negative error variance), for the WCST Errors variable.  Respecification of the model 
was therefore required.  Error variance for the WCST Errors variable was constrained, 
based on the reliability estimate of WCST Errors.  Given the reliability coefficient of 
WCST Errors (α = .71; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay and Curtiss, 1993), the residual 
variance is 29%.  The residual variance was multiplied by the variance of the WCST 
Errors variable in the model (49.62), to determine the error variance (14.39).  The error 
variance was then assigned to the WCST Errors variable.   
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Table 2 
Factor Matrix for the Original Three-Factor Model of Attention (Posner) 
Orient Alert Executive 
TEA-Ch SS TEA-Ch Score! Stroop 
Trails A TEA-Ch SS DT WCST Errors 
Trails B Digit Span WCST Categories 
Coding Letter-Number 
Sequencing 
 
The respecified model was subsequently analyzed, and was considered to be 
properly identified.  With respect to model fit, however, none of the Executive Attention 
factor parameters had significant estimates, suggesting that some (or all) of the variables 
did not load well on the Executive Attention factor.  In an attempt to better fit the three-
factor model, the Stroop test was moved to the Orient factor of attention (based on 
evidence from Manly et al., 2001), instead of the Executive Attention factor as proposed 
by Posner.  The resulting three-factor matrix, updated based on Manly’s (2001) 
description of a three-factor model of attention, can be found in Table 3.  
 
Table 3  
Factor Matrix for the Final Three-Factor Model of Attention (Manly) 
Focus_Select Sustain_Vigilance Switching_Control 
TEA-Ch SS TEA-Ch Score! WCST Errors 
Trails A TEA-Ch SS DT WCST Categories 
Trails B Digit Span  
Coding Letter-Number Sequencing 
Stroop     
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The respecified model – based on Manly’s descriptions of the three factors – was 
subsequently analyzed and the model was identified.  All of the parameter estimates were 
feasible and statistically significant in the third iteration of the model (see Table 4 for a 
description of parameter estimates from the three-factor model).  The goodness-of-fit 
statistics suggest that the model has a relatively good fit overall; some of the statistics 
represent a reasonable fit (p = .016; CFI = .943; RMSEA = .052), while others represent a 
good fit (CMIN/DF = 1.526; NFI = .859; PCLOSE = .425).  There is no evidence of 
model misfit (see Figure 1 for a representation of the three-factor model of attention).  
Four-factor model of attention.  A four-factor model of attention was 
determined based on Mirsky’s (1991) factor analysis (see Table 5 for the four-factor 
matrix).  The error variance for the WCST Errors variable was constrained to 14.39 in 
this model, consistent with the previous three-factor model.  A single iteration of the 
model was needed in order to be specified.  The four-factor model was analyzed using 
CFA and the model was identified. All of the parameter estimates were feasible and 
statistically significant (see Table 6 for a description of parameter estimates for the four-
factor model).  The goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that the model has a relatively good 
fit overall; some of the statistics represent a reasonable fit (p = .019; CFI = .948; RMSEA 
= .052), while others represent a good fit (CMIN/DF = 1.521; NFI = .870; PCLOSE = 
.431).  There is no evidence of model misfit (see Figure 2 for a representation of the four-
factor model).   
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Table 4 
Parameter Estimates for the Three-Factor Model of Attention 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
TEA-Ch SS ← Focus_Select 1.000ᵃ --- 0.621 
Stroop ← Focus_Select 1.182*** 0.287 0.712 
Coding ← Focus_Select 1.1*** 0.223 0.732 
Trails B ← Focus_Select 0.475*** 0.099 0.668 
Trails_A ← Focus_Select 0.406*** 0.083 0.658 
TEA-Ch Score! ← Sustain_Vigilance 1.000ᵃ --- 0.405 
TEA-Ch SS DT ← Sustain_Vigilance 1.539** 0.563 0.513 
Digit Span ← Sustain_Vigilance 1.97*** 0.579 0.858 
Letter-Number ← Sustain_Vigilance 1.759** 0.537 0.763 
WCST Categories ← Switching_Control 1.000ᵃ --- 0.832 
WCST Errors ← Switching_Control 8.864*** 0.695 0.950 
Variances and Covariances 
Focus_Select 
  
4.917** 1.739 
 Sustain_Vigilance 
  
2.000 1.167 
 Switching_Control 
  
1.711*** 0.334 
 
Errors 
err10 
  
14.390ᵃ --- 
 err5 
  
7.85*** 1.343 
 err4 
  
6.669*** 1.502 
 err3 
  
5.16*** 0.947 
 err2 
  
1.377*** 0.232 
 err1 
  
1.063*** 0.171 
 err9 
  
10.173*** 1.519 
 err8 
  
13.263*** 2.355 
 err7 
  
2.773** 0.846 
 err6 
  
4.431*** 0.824 
 err11     0.758*** 0.129   
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
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Figure 1. Three-factor model based on Manly’s model of attention. 
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Table 5  
Tests of Attention Used for the Four-Factor Model (Mirsky) 
Focus/Execute Sustain Shift Encode 
Coding TEA-Ch Score! WCST Errors  Digit Span 
Stroop TEA-Ch SS DT WCST Categories Letter-Number 
Trails A    
Trails B    
TEA-Ch SS       
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Table 6 
Parameter Estimates for the Four-Factor Model of Attention 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
Stroop ← Focus_Execute 1.000ᵃ --- 0.721 
Coding ← Focus_Execute 0.92*** 0.174 0.734 
TEA-Ch SS ← Focus_Execute 0.835*** 0.200 0.623 
Trails B ← Focus_Execute 0.388*** 0.087 0.654 
Trails A ← Focus_Execute 0.338*** 0.077 0.657 
TEA-Ch Score! ← Sustain 1.000ᵃ --- 0.509 
TEA-Ch SS DT ← Sustain 1.602** 0.563 0.679 
WCST Categories ← Shift 1.000ᵃ --- 0.830 
WCST Errors ← Shift 8.881*** 0.698 0.950 
Arithmetic ← Encode 1.289*** 0.256 0.777 
Digit Span ← Encode 1.000ᵃ --- 0.753 
Variances and Covariances 
Focus_Execute 
  
7.057** 2.537 
 Sustain 
  
3.108** 1.601 
 Shift 
  
1.679*** 0.325 
 Encode 
  
6.015*** 1.492 
 
Errors 
err8 
  
14.390ᵃ --- 
 err5 
  
6.527*** 1.503 
 err4 
  
5.126*** 0.939 
 err3 
  
7.776*** 1.333 
 err2 
  
1.416*** 0.234 
 err1 
  
1.063*** 0.172 
 err7 
  
8.898*** 1.637 
 err6 
  
9.298** 3.032 
 err9 
  
0.761*** 0.130 
 err11 
  
6.562** 2.163 
 err10     4.586*** 1.170   
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
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Figure 2. Four-factor model of attention based on Mirsky’s model.  
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Discussion 
Two prominent theories of attention were compared using a sample of children 
with AIS.  A three-factor model and a four-factor model were analyzed using 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and the parameter estimates and fit statistics were 
compared.  The three-factor model representing Posner’s theory of attention did not fit 
with the given data.  However, a similar three-factor model proposed by Manly et al. 
(2001) did fit the data reasonably well.  The four-factor model of attention described by 
Mirsky also had a reasonable fit with all of the tests of interest.  Although the three- and 
four-factor models of attention had equivalent fit indices, the four-factor model was more 
consistent with the theoretical constructs, neuroanatomical substrates, and developmental 
processes related to the attentional factors under consideration, as discussed below.  
Posner’s three-factor model did not represent a good fit with the data.  The 
primary difficulty with Posner’s model was that none of the tests included in the 
Executive Attention factor had significant parameter estimates with the factor of attention 
they were considered to be representing.  Posner and his colleagues (2007) have 
suggested that Executive Attention is represented by attention measures such as the 
Stroop Inhibition test.  Kavros et al. (2008) stated that the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) would fall under the same factor of Executive Attention.  However, in the 
current investigation, the Stroop test and the WCST subtests were not significantly 
correlated with one another; small, nonsignificant correlations were identified between 
Stroop and both WCST Errors (r = .215, ns) and WCST Categories (r = .186, ns).  These 
findings suggested that Stroop test and the WCST subtests do not load onto the same 
factor, and therefore do not both represent Posner’s factor of Executive Attention.   
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When Manly and colleagues (2001) were establishing their Test of Everyday 
Attention for Children (TEA-Ch), they examined some of the most traditional 
neuropsychological tests used to measure attention and determined their relationship both 
to one another and to the newly developed subtests of the TEA-Ch.  Although their 
terminology varied, Manly and colleagues identified a three-factor model of attention that 
maps onto Posner’s original three-factor model.  Manly referred to the three factors as: 1) 
Focus/Selective Attention; 2) Sustained Attention/Vigilance; and 3) Attentional 
Control/Switching.  Manly and colleagues found that although the WCST subtests loaded 
on the Attentional Control/Switching factor of attention (similar to Posner’s Executive 
Attention), the Stroop test had a higher correlation with tests of Focus/Selective Attention 
(similar to Posner’s Orient), such as the Trail Making Test (see Table 4 for the factors of 
attention represented by Manly’s three-factor model).  In the current investigation, when 
the Stroop test was moved to the factor equivalent to Manly’s Focus/Selective Attention 
and Posner’s Orient, the model represented a good fit for the data.  In fact, the fit 
statistics were comparable (showing nearly identical values) to those found when 
replicating Mirsky’s four-factor model.  
Given that the two models (i.e., Manly’s three-factor and Mirsky’s four-factor 
models) fit the data equally well, the question becomes: why separate out the factors of 
attention to create a four-factor model if a more parsimonious, three-factor model is 
available?  In other words, do the four factors represent a more accurate description of 
different theoretical functions, or an unnecessary elaboration of the three-factor model?  
These questions can be addressed by interpreting the current findings in light of 
psychometric, neuroanatomical, and developmental perspectives. 
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One possibility for the equivalence among models in terms of fit indices is that 
the three-factor model is simply a condensed version of the four-factor model, such that 
Manly’s Alerting/Sustained attention factor represents a combination of Mirsky’s Sustain 
and Encode factors.  In order to make this judgment, the theoretical constructs of the 
psychometric tests considered to be responsible for the factors of attention were 
considered.  One of the primary theoretical differences between Sustain and Encode, as 
defined by Mirsky, is that Sustain is a process of vigilance (i.e., sustaining attention over 
time), while Encode is considered to be equivalent to working memory, which involves 
holding the information in mind in order to work with it in some way.  Vigilance and 
working memory are arguably very different cognitive processes that should be measured 
by tests specific to their underlying attentional constructs. This conclusion is consistent 
with the four-factor model, which suggests that Sustain and Encode are individual 
factors, representing unique aspects of attention. 
The neuroanatomical correlates of the attentional network can also be taken into 
account in order to guide the selection of the three- vs. the four-factor model of attention.  
Posner and his colleagues have reported that Alerting attention is regulated by the 
prefrontal and lateral parietal cortical regions, as well as subcortical structures, such as 
the locus coeruleus (a nucleus in the pons of the brainstem) and the thalamus (a structure 
at the base of the cerebral hemispheres that projects to the cortex).  Similarly, Manly and 
colleagues suggested that the prefrontal regions are primarily responsible for regulation 
of sustaining attention or maintaining vigilance.  Mirsky’s Sustained attention was 
originally reported to be regulated by structures of the brainstem, such as the tectum and 
mesopontine regions of the reticular formation, as well as the thalamic nuclei.  However, 
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Koziol et al. (2014) have since outlined the literature suggesting that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, the ventral medial frontal cortex, and several subcortical structures (i.e., 
basal ganglia, striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus) have all been associated with 
sustained attention.  
The findings from the studies, demonstrating neuroanatomical correlates of 
attentional processes, suggest some overlap in the structures responsible for the vigilance 
aspect of attention found in both the three-factor models (e.g., Posner’s Alert, Manly’s 
Sustained Attention), and the four-factor models (e.g., Mirsky’s Sustain).  In fact, Mirsky 
et al. (1991) concluded that the Sustain factor of attention is similar to Posner’s Alerting 
attention (or what Manly referred to as Sustained Attention/Vigilance), because the 
sustained attention processes rely on areas of the brainstem and the medial thalamic 
region. 
Koziol et al. (2014) suggested that the neuroanatomical substrates of Encode 
make up a network that includes neuroanatomical structures connected through the 
Fronto-Parietal Network (FPN; including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior 
parietal lobe, anterior cingulate cortex, cerebellum, and the medial occipital cortex).  As 
the demands of the attentional task change – Koziol and colleagues (2014) report – the 
brain regions within the FPN appear to rapidly update their functional patterns of 
connectivity.   
There appears to be some overlap between the structures involved in both 
Encoding and Sustained Attention (e.g., both have some involvement of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex), a finding consistent with the theory that attention is a network of 
interrelated structures and cognitive processes.  Evidence for the distinction between 
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factors of Encoding and Sustained Attention comes from the fact that there are exclusive 
neuroanatomical structures that only appear to be responsible for the activation of certain 
attentional processes and not others.  For example, the subcortical structures (e.g., basal 
ganglia, thalamus, etc.) appear to play a role in Sustained Attention, but not in the 
Encoding attention, which involves a network of largely cortical structures.  This 
dissociation suggests that the two constructs are separable based on a functional 
neuroanatomical perspective.  
When examining individual factors of attention in children it is also important to 
consider the developmental context.  Given that aspects of Encode (or working memory) 
and Sustained Attention (or vigilance) are mediated by different neuroanatomical regions, 
these neurological structures are also expected to be established at varying stages 
throughout a child’s development.  Processes that are moderated by a network that 
includes subcortical cerebral structures (i.e., Sustained Attention or vigilance) are 
reportedly the earliest to develop in a child’s life (Richards, 2004).  In contrast, processes 
mediated primarily by the cortical structures (i.e., Encode or working memory) develop 
later in life and are not entirely established early in childhood (Rueda et al., 2004).  The 
development of Encode is therefore distinct from the development of Sustained 
Attention, which is controlled by earlier developing cerebral structures.  The evidence 
demonstrating that factors of Sustain and Encode are established at different stages in 
development suggests that the four-factor model of attention (which delineates these two 
factors) is a better representation of the attentional network than a three-factor model.   
Thus, when examining 1) the theoretical constructs of the tests traditionally used 
to evaluate attentional processes; 2) the neuroanatomical correlates responsible for the 
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development and activation of the factors of attention;  and 3) the development of 
individual factors of attention over time, a strong case can be made for the argument that 
Mirsky’s Encode and Mirsky’s Sustain/Manly’s Vigilance represent two unique factors 
of attention, rather than representing a variety of tests of attention that are grouped 
together within Posner’s Sustain factor.  Therefore, the four-factor model can be 
considered the best representation of the attentional network. 
Challenges and Further Considerations.  Despite the evidence suggesting that 
the four-factor model best represents attention in this sample, there were a number of 
challenges encountered throughout this investigation that may have influenced the 
findings.  First, there is considerable conceptual overlap in the literature about what 
constitutes attention, working memory, and executive functioning (Klenberg, Korkman, 
and Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001).  Certain neuropsychological tests are considered to be 
measures of attention by some and executive functioning (or even aspects of memory) by 
others.  In the current sample, the WCST scores did not load well with other factors in the 
models of interest.  An argument can be made that the WCST is not truly a test of 
attention and therefore does not load well with the other measures of attention.  Through 
the process of model specification, it was determined that the models with the fit best 
(i.e., those with equivalent fit to one another) were those in which WCST subscales 
represented an exclusive factor (i.e., Mirsky’s Shift or Manly’s Attentional 
Control/Switching).  The finding that the WCST did not load well with the Stroop 
subtests may suggest that Stroop and WCST are tapping into different cognitive 
processes altogether, such as attention and executive functioning for example, and 
therefore should not both be considered measures of attention.  
58 
 
Executive attention is considered to be a measure of response inhibition, 
attentional control, switching, shifting, and conflict resolution (Posner, 2007; Manly, 
2001; Anderson et al., 2001).  The WCST is, by definition, a measure of executive 
function, requiring strategic planning, searching, relying on feedback to shift cognitive 
set, and inhibiting impulsive behaviour (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006).  Although 
there is a significant overlap between executive aspects of attention and the definition of 
executive functioning, there appears to be an added problem-solving or metacognitive 
component to the WCST that exceeds the definitions of attentional functioning.  
As Anderson et al. (2001) described, executive functions make up several factors, 
including attention control (i.e., selective and sustained attention), cognitive flexibility 
(i.e., working memory, shifting attention, and self-monitoring), and goal setting (i.e., 
initiating, planning, problem-solving).  Therefore, executive functions encompass some 
(but not all) factors of attention.  For instance, Klenberg et al. (2001) found that although 
inhibition, attention, and executive functions are highly interrelated cognitive processes, 
their developmental trajectories are separate from one another, identifying them as unique 
aspects of cognition.  As the investigators noted, there is a lack of conceptual clarity 
throughout the research on the development of attentional and executive functions.  There 
appears to be significant overlap across the concepts, which makes it difficult to 
distinguish between them in order to operationalize and measure attentional or executive 
functions. 
Given Anderson’s (2001) argument that the WCST is not a measure of attention 
after all, but more of a pure executive functioning task, one could argue that Posner’s 
three-factor model of attention would be theoretically sound, as long as the WCST 
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subtests did not represent aspects of Executive Attention.  In fact, in the current 
investigation, when the Stroop Inhibition and Switching subtests from the D-KEFS were 
substituted for the WCST Errors and Number of Categories in Posner’s model, the fit 
estimates were reasonable, suggesting that Posner’s three-factor model represents the 
data of interest, as long as WCST is not included in the model.  
Difficulties with testing the models in the current investigation arose as several 
issues with the data from the WCST subtests were encountered, which resulted in 
problems initially identifying the models.  One issue was multicollinearity among the 
subscales of the WCST (i.e., between the Number of Errors and Number of Perseverative 
Errors variables), which was eliminated by removing the Number of Perseverative Errors 
variable and replacing it with the Number of Categories achieved, a variable that taps into 
different aspects of the WCST.  Another issue that arose in the analysis was the negative 
error variance of the WCST Errors variable, which was subsequently constrained in order 
to identify the model.   
One possible explanation for the challenges with the negative error variance is 
that the range of responses in the WCST was not as wide as that of other tests, and there 
was a much higher variance in the WCST scores.  It is possible that the subtests of the 
WCST do not fit with the sample because the data specific to the WCST are not missing 
at random.  In fact, the WCST is rarely given to young children, likely due to the fact that 
executive aspects of attention are not expected to be developed before the age of 10 years 
(Rueda et al., 2004).  When looking at the sample of 196 participants, the age at testing 
ranges from 3.42 through 23. 26 years of age for the entire sample (i.e., a 19 year range), 
with a mean of 11.50 years, a median of 10.94 years, and a mode of 7.32 years (see 
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Appendix E).  When examining the WCST data in isolation, however, the age at testing 
ranges from 6.88 through 23.26 years (i.e., a 16 year range), with a mean of 13.05 years, 
a median of 13.13 years, and a mode of 17 years, which is much higher than the mode of 
the entire sample.  Unfortunately, the restricted age range within this set of data is a 
factor of using archival data.  
Despite the challenges presented within the data, the analyses demonstrated that 
both a three- and four-factor model of attention were identified, and therefore both 
effectively represented the data from the group of children with AIS.  In reference to the 
competing theories of attention, Mirsky et al. (1991) suggested that: 
The nature of the neuropsychological model of attention that is created depends 
upon the behavioural data that are used to generate it.  Since all these conceptions 
deal with fundamentally the same database, there is a fair degree of communality 
among them; the differences seem to be a function of which part of the database 
the authors have chosen to emphasize (p. 140).  
Given that the emphasis, in the present investigation, was on the theoretical 
constructs measured by various neuropsychological tests, the unique neuroanatomical 
correlates associated with each attentional process, and an understanding of the 
development of attentional networks throughout childhood, the four-factor model was 
determined to be the best fit for the data.  As such, the data suggest that performance on 
the four factors of attention can be used to examine predictors of outcome in a clinical 
sample of children with AIS.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Goal #2: Full Latent Variable Model 
Method 
The second goal of the investigation was to determine whether Age at Stroke or 
Age at Testing are predictors of outcome on factors of attention, and whether the 
predictors modify the relationship with one another within the model.  Given that the 
four-factor model of attention was determined to be the best fit for the data in Goal #1, 
the second goal was to determine the full latent variable model, including both the 
measurement model (i.e., the previously determined factor analytic model) and the 
structural model (i.e., the predictor variables included for regression).  This process first 
involved examining Age at Stroke as a predictor for each factor of attention.  Secondly, 
Age at Stroke was considered a predictor of each factor of attention while controlling for 
Age at Testing.   
Although the control variable of interest is Age at Testing (given that aspects of 
attention are established at different ages) there was concern that examining both Age at 
Stroke and Age at Testing within the model may result in significant multicollinearity 
among the variables, as they both represent an individual’s age.  Time since Stroke (a 
variable representing number of years, but not age) was thus included in the model to 
control for Age at Testing.  Age at Testing was also examined as a predictor of outcome 
on each factor of attention.  In the final step Age at Testing was considered as a predictor 
of outcome while controlling for Age at Stroke, by including Time since Stroke as the 
control variable. 
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In summary, four versions of the full latent variable model were considered in 
Goal #2: 1) Age at Stroke as a predictor of attention; 2) Age at Stroke as a predictor of 
attention while controlling for Age at Testing; 3) Age at Testing as a predictor of 
attention; and 4) Age at Testing as a predictor of attention while controlling for Age at 
Stroke.  
Results 
When Age at Stroke was included as a predictor variable, the model was 
identified (Figure 3).  The parameter estimates between Age at Stroke and the attention 
factors are found in Table 7.  There was a significant positive relationship between Age at 
Stroke and Shift.  In addition, there was a significant positive relationship between Age at 
Stroke and Encode.  Neither Focus/Execute nor Sustain were significantly predicted by 
Age at Stroke. 
 
Table 7 
Parameter Estimates of Age at Stroke from the Structural Equation Model for the Four-
Factor Model of Attention with Age at Stroke as a Predictor 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
Focus_Execute ← Age at Stroke 0.002 0.047 0.005 
Sustain ← Age at Stroke 0.077 0.060 0.239 
Shift ← Age at Stroke 0.509* 0.200 0.229 
Encode ← Age at Stroke 0.089* 0.046 0.166 
* p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
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Figure 3. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Stroke 
as predictor variable. 
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To control for the effects of the child’s Age at Testing, the model was analyzed 
with both Age at Stroke and Time since Stroke as predictor variables (see Figure 4).  
When the two predictor variables were included, the model was identified; however, 
there were 50 parameter estimates in the model, suggesting that the total power would be 
limited if one attempted to interpret model fit statistics.  The parameter estimates between 
Age at Stroke and the four factors of attention, when Age at Testing was controlled for, 
can be found in Table 8.  There was a slight increase in the parameter estimate between 
Age at Stroke and Shift, with the relationship remaining significant.  The relationship 
between Age at Stroke and Focus/Execute became significantly more pronounced; when 
controlling for Age at Testing, there is a significant negative relationship between Age at 
Stroke and Focus/Execute.  The relationship between Age at Stroke and Encode 
decreased, and is no longer significant when controlling for Age at Testing.  The 
relationship between Age at Stroke and Sustain remained nonsignificant, even after 
controlling for Age at Testing.  
 
Table 8 
Parameter Estimates of Age at Stroke from the Structural Equation Model for the Four-
Factor Model of Attention with Age at Stroke as a Predictor while Controlling for Age at 
Testing 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
Focus_Execute ← Age at Stroke -0.131 * 0.064 -0.248 
Sustain ← Age at Stroke 0.034 
 
0.082 0.107 
Shift ← Age at Stroke 0.094 ** 0.035 0.357 
Encode ← Age at Stroke 0.008   0.059 0.017 
 * p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
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Figure 4. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Stroke 
and Time since Stroke as predictor variables. 
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When the model was analyzed with Age at Testing as a single predictor variable, 
the model was identified (see Figure 5).  The parameter estimates for the relationships 
between Age at Testing and the four factors of interest can be found in Table 9.  There 
was a significant positive relationship between Age at Testing and Shift.  There was a 
significant negative relationship between Focus/Execute and Age at Testing.  Neither 
Encode nor Sustain was significantly predicted by Age at Testing as the sole predictor 
variable.  
 
Table 9 
Parameter Estimates of Age at Testing from the Structural Equation Model for the Four-
Factor Model of Attention with Age at Testing as a Predictor 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
Focus_Execute ← Age at Testing -0.147 * 0.066 -0.222 
Sustain ← Age at Testing -0.008 
 
0.085 -0.018 
Shift ← Age at Testing 0.091 ** 0.035 0.274 
Encode ← Age at Testing -0.007   0.061 -0.010 
 * p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
 
To control for the effects of the child’s Age at Stroke, the model was analyzed 
with both Age at Testing and Time since Stroke as predictor variables (see Figure 6).  
When the two predictor variables were included, the model was identified; however, 
there were 50 parameter estimates in the model, suggesting that the total power would be 
limited if one attempted to interpret model fit statistics.  The parameter estimates between 
Age at Testing and the four factors of attention, when Age at Stroke was controlled for,  
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Figure 5. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Testing 
as predictor variable. 
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Figure 6. Structural equation model of four-factor model of attention with Age at Testing 
and Time since Stroke as predictor variables. 
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can be found in Table 10.  The parameter estimate between Age at Testing and Shift 
remained significant; there was no change in the estimate values or the level of 
significance when Age at Stroke was controlled for.  The negative relationship between 
Focus/Execute and Age at Testing also remained significant; there was no change in the 
estimate values or the level of significance when Age at Stroke was controlled for.  
Although the estimates for Sustain and Encode increased slightly when Age at Stroke 
was controlled for, neither factor was significantly predicted by Age at Testing. 
 
Table 10 
Parameter Estimates of Age at Testing from the Structural Equation Model for the Four-
Factor Model of Attention with Age at Testing as a Predictor while Controlling for Age 
at Stroke 
Parameters 
Unstandardized 
Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Standardized 
Estimates 
Factor Loadings 
Focus_Execute ← Age at Testing -0.131 * 0.064 -0.202 
Sustain ← Age at Testing 0.034 
 
0.082 0.08 
Shift ← Age at Testing 0.094 ** 0.035 0.283 
Encode ← Age at Testing 0.008 
 
0.059 0.013 
 * p ≤ .05.  ** p ≤ .01.  *** p = .00.  ᵃ not tested for significance. 
 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
In an attempt to begin to tease apart the relationship between different lesion 
characteristics and the timing of strokes, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted to compare Age at Stroke to particular lesion characteristics of interest in the 
stroke literature: severity of injury (single vs. multiple infarcts); laterality (left- vs. right-
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sided lesions); and lesion location (cortical, subcortical, and combined 
cortical/subcortical strokes).  
There was no main effect of injury severity, F(2,180) = 2.94, ns; Age at Stroke 
did not differ significantly for children with single vs. multiple infarcts.  There was no 
main effect of laterality, F(2,180) = .917, ns; Age at Stroke did not differ significantly for 
children with strokes localized to the left vs. right cerebral hemisphere.  There was, 
however, a significant main effect of lesion location, F(2,180) = 6.35, p = .002.  A Tukey 
post hoc test revealed that Age at Stroke was statistically significantly older for children 
with strokes localized to the subcortical regions (M = 6.55, SD = 5.23) compared to those 
with strokes localized to the cortical regions (2.11 ± 4.45 years, p = .000) and those with 
combined cortical and subcortical strokes (4.26 ± 2.29 years, p = .018).  There was no 
statistically significant difference between children with cortical strokes (M = 2.11, SD = 
4.07) and those with a combination of cortical and subcortical strokes (M = 4.26, SD = 
5.13), in terms of Age at Stroke (2.11 ± 2.15 years, ns).  
Discussion 
In the present investigation, Age at Stroke and Age at Testing were examined as 
predictors of outcome on the four-factor model of attention.  At one end of the spectrum 
of cerebral recovery, the vulnerability theory suggests that the young brain is more 
susceptible to impairment following cerebral insult than an older, more developed brain 
(Hebb, 1947).  As a result, proponents of the vulnerability theory argue that younger Age 
at Stroke would be associated with greater impairment across factors of attention than 
later Age at Stroke.  As an extension of the vulnerability model, researchers have also 
suggested that children with early acquired brain injuries tend to grow into their 
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impairments, due to the “snowball” effects of early compromise (McLinden et al., 2007).  
Following this line of reasoning, children with later Age at Testing would be expected to 
have the greatest impairment in cognitive abilities.  An interaction effect might also be 
expected between the two age variables, such that children with earlier Age at Stroke 
who have later Age at Testing would be expected to have the most pronounced deficits in 
cognitive abilities.  
At the other end of the recovery spectrum, proponents of the plasticity theory 
(based on Kennard’s early findings) argue that the young brain is more amenable to 
reorganization following cerebral insult than the older brain, given that skills are more 
likely to be fully established and no longer as plastic in an older child or adult.  Based 
upon the theory of plasticity, children with later Age at Stroke would be expected to have 
worse outcomes than children with earlier strokes.   In order to describe the relationship 
between Age at Stroke and Age at Testing with the factors of interest in the present 
investigation, each factor of attention will be considered individually in the following 
section.    
Focus/Execute.  Age at Stroke did not significantly predict outcome on 
Focus/Execute when included in the model as the sole predictor variable (Figure 3); 
however, when Age at Testing was controlled for (Figure 4), there was a significant 
negative relationship between Age at Stroke and Focus/Execute.  This finding suggests 
that Age at Testing is modifying the relationship between a child’s Age at Stroke and his 
or her performance on Focus/Execute.  Similarly, Age at Testing had a significant 
negative relationship with Focus/Execute, whether or not Age at Stroke was controlled 
for in the model (Figures 5 and 6).  
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The results demonstrate that younger Age at Stroke is associated with better 
outcomes on measures of Focus/Execute, regardless of the age of a child at the time of 
testing.  In addition, older Age at Testing is associated with worse outcomes on measures 
of Focus/Execute.  The findings of the present investigation are not consistent with the 
vulnerability theory, given that Focus/Execute is less vulnerable to insult during the 
earlier years of life, when the skill is not established or is only in the beginning stages of 
development.  Focus/Execute appears to be more vulnerable to insult later in life, when 
damage inflicted upon a more mature brain affects the already established skill, or when 
the stroke occurs during a critical period of development for that skill.  The findings may 
be more consistent with a plasticity theory, such that insult earlier in life does not tend to 
have a negative impact on the Focus/Execute skills to the same extent as later insult.  The 
Focus/Execute aspect of attention appears to be relatively plastic, and demonstrates 
resilience following early stroke.     
Focus/Execute is argued to fall under the umbrella of speed of processing, which 
is considered by some to be an executive aspect of attention (Shanahan et al., 2006).  
Processing speed appears to have a significant influence on an individual’s ability to 
attend to stimuli, and is thought to be mediated by subcortical structures and anterior 
brain regions (Anderson et al., 2006).  Processing speed tends to develop gradually 
throughout childhood (Anderson et al., 2001; McKay et al., 1994; Rueda et al., 2004), 
with a sudden increase in proficiency of both processing speed and attention control (as 
measured through digit span tasks for example) around age 15 years (Anderson et al., 
2001).   
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The findings in the present investigation are consistent with the theory that the 
skills required for Focus/Execute tasks develop later in childhood, and are therefore more 
vulnerable to impairment later in childhood or adolescence.  As the demands for a 
particular skill increase over time, it becomes more difficult for a child to compensate for 
an area of weakness, especially as his or her peers are continuing to make gains and 
beginning to show skills equivalent to adult levels of proficiency.  Perhaps these skills are 
still plastic earlier in childhood, and impairment prior to the establishment of the skill is 
not as detrimental as with damage due to later insult that occurs either during the ongoing 
process of developing or after the establishment of the skill.  In addition to vulnerability 
to later insult, the findings suggest that the later in childhood or adolescence an individual 
is assessed, the more likely his or her impairments are to be noticeable, as the gap 
between typically-developing children and those with strokes continues to widen. 
Sustain.  The Sustain factor of attention was not significantly predicted by Age at 
Stroke, whether or not Age at Testing was controlled for in the model (Figures 3 and 4).  
Similarly, performances on measures of the Sustain factor were not significantly 
predicted by Age at Testing, whether or not Age at Stroke was controlled for in the model 
(Figures 5 and 6).  Taken together, these findings demonstrate that performance on tests 
of Sustain is not significantly impacted by a child’s age at the time of stroke or the time 
of testing.  The finding that Age at Stroke does not predict outcomes on Sustain suggests 
that impact of an injury to the Sustain factor of attention will be similar, regardless of the 
age of the child.  Sustain does not appear to be particularly vulnerable to early insult, nor 
is there a greater likelihood of impairment following injury after the establishment of the 
skill, later in childhood.  The theory of plasticity may explain these results, such that 
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Sustain is not vulnerable to insult, and the brain is able to reorganize in order to spare 
functioning in this attentional process.  
Research has consistently demonstrated that sustained attention, or vigilance, is 
the earliest developing factor of attention (Rueda et al., 2004).  Demands on the Sustain 
aspects of attention may not increase over time, as would be seen in the more executive 
aspects of attention.  The skill level that a child has achieved early in childhood may not 
change over time; as a result, Age at Testing would not be related to (i.e., significantly 
predict) outcome on Sustain.   
Shift. When examining the Shift factor of attention, Age at Stroke is a significant 
predictor of outcome, whether or not Age at Testing is controlled for in the model 
(Figures 3 and 4).  The significant positive relationship found between Shift and Age at 
Stroke suggests that the older the child is at the time of his or her stroke, the better the 
child’s performance will be on measures of Shift, regardless of his or her age at the time 
of testing.  The findings suggest that the Shift factor may therefore be more vulnerable to 
early insult than later injury.  
Age at Testing is also a significant predictor of Shift, whether or not Age at 
Stroke is controlled for in the model.  This finding suggests that regardless of when a 
child’s stroke occurs, they will tend to have better performance on measures of Shift the 
later they are tested in childhood or adolescence.  The Shift factor of attention tends to be 
present early in infancy (around 6 to 9 months of age) but the ability to disengage from a 
particular stimulus slowly improves over time, tending not to be fully established until 
later in adolescence (Rueda et al., 2004), and therefore children’s performance will 
improve on the tests of shifting attention as they get older and the skills become more 
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solidified.  Taken together, the findings would suggest that the poorest outcomes on 
measures of Shift are likely to occur for a child who has an earlier stroke and is tested 
early on in childhood, before Shift is expected to be fully developed. 
In their review of the “Mirsky Model”, Koziol et al. (2014) stated that Mirsky’s 
Shift falls under the greater umbrella term of executive attention.  As mentioned 
previously, cognitive developmental literature suggests that the more executive aspects of 
cognitive functioning (including executive attention) are established later in childhood.  
Specifically, conflict resolution and inhibition are later developing cognitive skills and 
are critical for performance on the WCST subtests, which make up Mirsky’s Shift.  In 
regards to Shift, the results of the current investigation support the theory of 
vulnerability, suggesting that early stroke will lead to greater impairment in a child’s 
performance on measures of shifting attention.  However, the findings contradict the idea 
that children tend to grow into their cognitive impairments. In fact, children in the present 
investigation demonstrated improvement in performance over time on the Shift measures, 
as executive factors of attention are expected to develop and better compensate. 
Encode.  When examining Encode, there is a significant relationship between 
Encode and Age at Stroke as the sole predictor of outcome (Figure 3).  When Age at 
Testing is controlled for, however, this relationship no longer exists (Figure 4).  This 
finding suggests that Age at Testing is somehow modifying the relationship between Age 
at Stroke and Encode.  On the other hand, when Age at Testing is examined as a predictor 
variable, performance on Encode is not predicted by Age at Testing, whether or not Age 
at Stroke is controlled for (Figures 5 and 6).  Taken together, these findings suggest that 
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performance on factors of Encode may not be affected by stroke to the same extent that 
other factors of attention appear to be.   
Research suggests that Encode is an attentional process mediated by cortical 
structures (Mirksy et al., 1991; Koziol et al., 2014), which tend to develop slowly 
throughout a child’s life, and are not fully established in until later in adolescence 
(Anderson et al., 2001).  Encode (a working memory process) does not appear to be 
influenced by the timing of a stroke in a consistent manner, such that early insult would 
impair the later development of a process (consistent with the early vulnerability theory), 
or that later injury would be associated with greater impairment of an established skill 
(consistent with the early plasticity theory).  It is possible that, because Encode is a skill 
that slowly develops throughout childhood, there may not be a clear relationship between 
the timing of the injury or the timing of testing and outcome on measures of Encode.  
Levels of impairment, or resilience, may be relatively equivalent for this particular factor 
of attention across individuals with paediatric strokes. 
Challenges and Further Considerations.  Throughout the present investigation, 
there were challenges encountered that may have influenced the results of the study.  One 
of the primary concerns with the statistical analyses was the large amount of missing 
data, coupled with a relatively small sample size.  With only 196 participants who met 
the inclusion criteria in this investigation, the sample size was not large enough to 
account for the number of parameters to be estimated in a model with missing data.  In 
fact, in the full latent variable model, which included both predictor variables and the 
four factors of attention, there were 50 parameters. According to Mueller and Hancock’s 
(2010) rule of thumb, a sample size of 250 would have been necessary to accurately 
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interpret the fit indices of the model.  As a result, goodness-of-fit statistics were 
considered unreliable and could not be interpreted in the current study, for the full latent 
variable models.   
The only options to decrease the number of parameters to be estimated in 
structural equation modeling are: 1) decreasing the amount of missing data; 2) increasing 
the sample size; or 3) reducing the number of parameters in the model.  Given the clinical 
and retrospective nature of the current investigation, it was not possible to ensure that an 
identical test battery was administered to a large sample of children; therefore, the option 
of decreasing the number of parameters was initially considered.  However, in order to 
preserve the clinical integrity of the models (i.e., accurately reproduce the original 
models and have at least two variables per factor in the model) it was determined that 50 
parameters were necessary to represent the structural model.  As a result, the power of the 
model was limited and fit indices of the full latent variable models were not considered. 
In addition to the consideration of the number of parameters being estimated in 
the model, the relationship between Age at Stroke and the factors of attention should be 
interpreted with the caveat that the distribution of Age at Stroke was not normal in the 
current sample (see Appendix A).  In fact, 38% of children in the sample had a stroke 
within the first year of life.  This finding appears to be relatively consistent with the 
literature reporting that approximately 32% of paediatric AIS occur within the perinatal 
period (i.e., the first month of life; deVeber, 2000).  The fact that such a large proportion 
of children had their strokes prior to the age of 1 year suggests that there is limited 
variance in the sample.  The relationship between Age at Stroke and the factors of interest 
was likely affected by the limited variance.  Future researchers are encouraged to 
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examine age by categorical groups.  For example, comparing children with strokes during 
the perinatal period to those in the early or late childhood (e.g., Westmacott et al., 2010) 
would more clearly demonstrate the relationship between Age at Stroke and outcome on 
each of the four factors of attention.  A categorical analysis can be accomplished with a 
larger, more complete, sample than was available in the present investigation.   
An additional limitation to the second goal of the investigation was the lack of 
data regarding attrition within the sample.  A concern with using clinical data is that 
patients who fail to return for reassessment may not do so at random; there may be 
confounding variables, such as the severity of symptom presentation.  Given the limited 
availability of data in an archival sample, it was not possible to access the rates of 
attrition for any particular child who participated in the study.   In the stroke program at 
the Hospital for Sick Children, parents are encouraged to assess their children following 
the original stroke, and are provided the opportunity for reassessment throughout the 
child’s life, until the age of 18 years, regardless of the severity of their clinical 
presentation.  Children are therefore provided with repeated opportunity to determine 
their needs and make recommendations for supports.  Given that all children are provided 
with identical opportunity to access the assessments, the investigation proceeds with the 
assumption that attrition does not significantly impact the sampling procedures.    
Along a similar line, in their validation of the Paediatric Stroke Outcome Measure 
(PSOM; a study using the sample of children from the Paediatric Stroke Clinic at the 
Hospital for Sick Children), Kitchen et al. (2012) considered the possible limitation that 
not all children referred to the clinic consented to participate in the testing; there was 
concern of referral bias within the study.  The researchers noted, however, that the 
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sample of participants in question had a normal distribution of neuropsychological test 
performance, and consisted not only of a wide range of age groups but also a range in the 
severity of deficits.  Kitchen and her colleagues noted that the normal distribution of the 
large sample decreased the likelihood of potential confounding from referral bias, which 
may be related to severity within the population.  Based on this precedent, it was 
considered unlikely that the attrition rates of the sample in the current investigation were 
related to severity of clinical presentation.   
Finally, the post-hoc analyses, comparing Age at Stroke and lesion location, 
provided the opportunity to further delineate the relationships between the predictor 
variables identified in the current investigation.  The findings suggest that strokes 
localized to the subcortical regions tend to occur later in childhood (mean age of 6.55 
years); therefore, factors of attention that are mediated by subcortical structures (e.g., 
Focus/Execute, Sustain) are less likely to be impacted during a child’s early life.  Given 
that Focus/Execute tends to develop gradually throughout childhood and peak later in 
adolescence, the skill may not be established at an early age, prior to the occurrence of 
the average subcortical stroke.  Sustain, on the other hand, is one of the earliest 
established factors of attention, and has a considerable subcortical involvement.  It is 
possible that the majority of strokes that affect brain regions that mediate Sustain occur 
later in childhood, after the skill has already been established.  This line of reasoning is 
consistent with the findings of the current investigation, such that there was no linear 
relationship been Age at Stroke and Sustain.   
In contrast to the subcortical lesions, the findings suggest that strokes localized to 
cortical regions tend to occur earlier in childhood (with a mean age of 2.11 years).  
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Factors of attention that are largely mediated by cortical structures (e.g., Encode, Shift) 
tend to have a slower development throughout childhood and adolescence, and therefore 
may be more plastic following earlier insult, prior to the establishment of the skill. 
The post-hoc analyses reviewed here demonstrate that Age at Stroke is 
significantly associated with the location of the lesions, suggesting that certain cerebral 
structures are more susceptible to injury at different ages throughout development.  
Future researchers are encouraged to pursue this line of research by examining possible 
interactions between Age at Stroke, lesion location, and each of the four factors of 
attention identified in the current model, in order to provide a clearer picture of outcomes 
on measures of attention.  
CHAPTER 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
In the present investigation, the first goal was to determine a model of attention 
that best represented a sample of children with AIS.  A three-factor model based on 
Posner’s theory of attention was compared to a four-factor model, representing Mirsky’s 
theory of attention.  Despite finding that both a three- and a four-factor model of attention 
had relatively similar fit indices and both represented a good fit with the sample, when 
theoretically-based psychometric properties, neuroanatomical correlates, and 
developmental factors were taken into consideration, the four-factor model was 
determined to be the most appropriate model of attention to represent the sample of 
children.   
In the second goal of the investigation, predictors of attention were sought to be 
identified, with respect to the four-factor model of attention.  Both Age at Stroke and Age 
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at Testing were determined to be significant predictors of Focus/Execute and Shift, while 
Sustain and Encode were not significantly predicted by either Age at Stroke or Age at 
Testing.  More specifically, performance on tests of Focus/Execute tend to become worse 
the older the child is at the time of his or her stroke (when controlling for age at the time 
of testing), as well as the older the child’s age at testing in general.  On the other hand, 
performance on tests of Shift tend to be worse the younger the child is at the time of his 
or her stroke as well as the younger the child’s age at the time of testing.  
Despite the predictions made by the vulnerability and plasticity theories of 
development, the findings of the current investigation suggest that it may be too 
simplistic to consider the young brain as either vulnerable to early impairment or plastic 
and thus better able to reorganize following damage.  The results of the present study 
demonstrated that individual cognitive abilities may be differentially influenced by 
damage at varying points throughout development.  The findings suggest that factors of 
attention that are established early in life (i.e., sustained attention or vigilance) may be 
relatively plastic, such that early insult does not necessarily lead to greater impairment 
than later damage.  On the other hand, some skills that are not fully established until later 
in life (e.g., focusing and executive attention, shifting attention) may have critical periods 
during which disruption has disproportionately adverse effects.   
For example, Focus/Execute and Shift, both considered executive aspects of 
attention, show different patterns of impairment throughout development. Focus/Execute 
tends to be more plastic earlier in life, showing relative resilience to earlier stroke, and 
demonstrating greater impairment as the child develops over time and the skill becomes 
more fully established.  In contrast, Shift tends to be more vulnerable, showing greater 
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impairment the earlier the stroke occurs in development and the younger the age at 
testing.   
The Encode (or working memory) factor of attention tends to continue to develop 
slowly throughout childhood and adolescence and does not appear to have critical periods 
of development such that outcomes can be linearly predicted by age factors.  In this 
particular aspect of attention, the level of impairment (or resilience) may be relatively 
stable across development, regardless of a child’s age at the time of stroke or at the time 
of testing.  
Despite the relatively simplistic arguments of the vulnerability vs. plasticity 
theories, researchers have demonstrated the complexities of contributing factors with 
respect to functional outcome.  Throughout her research career, Kennard sought to 
explain the factors that influenced outcome following cerebral insult; she identified age at 
injury and lesion location as significant predictors (Dennis, 2010).  Consistent with these 
findings, post-hoc analyses in the present investigation demonstrated that children with 
strokes localized to the subcortical regions tended to be significantly older at the time of 
stroke than children with strokes localized to cortical regions alone or with combined 
cortical/subcortical lesions.  
Within the paediatric stroke literature, the argument has been made that not only 
do earlier strokes tend to be associated with greater cognitive impairment, but when the 
location of the lesion is taken into account, there are interactions between the Age at 
Stroke and the affected neuroanatomical regions.  For example, Westmacott et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that lesion location modulates the effect of Age at Stroke on cognitive 
outcome.  For those who acquired subcortical lesions, the children with perinatal stroke 
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(i.e., stroke occurring within the first month of life) had the greatest vulnerability for 
impairment, while cortical lesions were associated with the greatest vulnerability in the 
early childhood stroke group (i.e., stroke occurring between 1 month to 5 years of age).   
Furthermore, Westmacott et al. (2010) demonstrated that there appear to be 
critical periods of development that are most vulnerable to insult and that these periods 
vary depending upon the neuroanatomical regions in question.  In fact, for cortical 
lesions, a U-shaped curve can be graphically represented to demonstrate the relationship 
between Age at Stroke and outcomes on the cognitive processes of interest; Westmacott 
and her colleagues demonstrated that perinatal and later childhood Age at Stroke were 
not associated with the same degree of impairment as strokes occurring during the critical 
early childhood period (1 month to 5 years old).  Other studies have also demonstrated U-
shaped relationships between age at lesion and severity of impairment using different age 
at stroke cutoffs, such that strokes occurring during early childhood (0- 5 years old) or 
later childhood (10-18 years old) were associated with greater impairment than those 
occurring during middle childhood (5 and 10 years old; see Murias et al., 2014 for a 
review).    
In the present investigation, it was noted that certain attentional processes could 
be significantly predicted by the age of a child at the time of his or her stroke, as well as 
the age at testing (i.e., Focus/Execute, Shift); however, not all of the attentional processes 
demonstrated clear linear relationships (i.e., Sustain, Encode).  Due to sample size 
limitations, it is beyond the scope of the present study to examine the type of relationship 
that may occur between individuals from different age categories and outcomes on the 
factors of attention.  However, it is possible that a U-shaped curve would be noted in the 
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present investigation as well, such that earlier and later injury would be related with 
better outcomes than injury occurring during the early to middle childhood years, or vice 
versa.  Future researchers are encouraged to further examine the relationship between 
Age at Stroke and Age at Testing on the outcomes of the factors of attention, as the 
relationships between age and outcome may not be linear (particularly for factors such as 
Sustain and Encode).  
 Although the current findings clearly demonstrated that Age at Testing somehow 
modified the relationship between Age at Stroke and the outcomes on certain factors of 
attention, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to be able to speak to the mechanism 
by which Age at Testing alters this relationship.  Mediating and moderating effects are 
typically small, and therefore require a large sample size in order to determine whether or 
not these processes are modifying the relationship between the predictor variables.   
The findings of the current investigation highlight the importance of considering 
attention as a network of overlapping yet distinct processes, as opposed to a solitary 
cognitive ability.  Based on the results of the present study, the development of 
attentional processes does not appear to be easily described as either vulnerable or plastic 
when considering early damage.  In addition, children who acquire early cerebral insult 
may grow into their impairments over time, as the demands on the cognitive ability are 
increased; however, this snowball effect of increasing demands does not occur for all 
factors of attention.  The development of attentional processes should, therefore, be taken 
into consideration given that individual factors are differentially affected by impairment 
over time.  
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In practice, clinicians are encouraged to assess a child’s level of ability on all four 
factors of attention, as opposed to simply examining the most traditionally relied upon 
measures of attention.  An understanding of a child’s abilities on each of the four factors 
of attention will allow the clinician to: a) monitor the child’s progress over time, as 
particular skills continue to develop and differentially demonstrate gains; b) assess for 
discrepancies among the factors of attention and target them individually through 
intervention strategies; and c) predict possible trajectories based on the known 
relationships between Age at Stroke and outcome on individual factors over time.   
Although the four-factor model of attention is considered to be representative of 
the general population despite relying on data from a paediatric stroke sample, outcomes 
across these factors of attention are likely differentially influenced by the type of damage 
acquired to the brain.  Future research should continue to investigate how age variables 
can be used to predict outcomes across factors of attention in different clinical 
populations, such as children with seizures or traumatic brain injuries, for example.  
Investigators are encouraged to continue to evaluate the four-factor model of attention 
using different clinical populations in an attempt to provide a broader understanding of 
the implications of age factors.       
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Appendix A 
Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System 
The Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & 
Kramer, 2001) is a standardized measure made up of nine subtests that assess executive 
function, which is a higher level cognitive ability that relies on basic cognitive skills, 
such as attention, language etc.  Several studies have demonstrated that performance on 
the D-KEFS subtests is sensitive to frontal lobe lesions, frontal-lobe epilepsy, Fetal 
Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (FASD), and subcortical ischemic vascular disease in older 
adults (see Strauss et al., 2006 for a review).   
Colour-Word Interference Test.  The D-KEFS colour-word interference test is a 
variant of the Stroop procedure that can be used as a verbal measure of cognitive 
flexibility, as well as the ability to inhibit over learned responses and generate conflicting 
responses (Strauss et al., 2006).  In Condition 1, children are asked to name patches of 
colour.  In Condition 2, children read colour names, printed in black ink.  In Condition 3, 
children name the ink colour in which the words are printed.  In Condition 4, children 
switch between naming the ink colours and reading the words.   
The first two conditions are measures of word and colour naming, and therefore 
require basic attention skills.  The third condition is a measure of executive function in 
terms of cognitive inhibitions and maintaining a course of action despite intrusions and 
can also be considered a measure of speeded processing (Boone, Pontón, Gorsuch, 
González, & Miller, 1998).  The fourth condition involves more complex executive 
functions, in terms of switching between rules.  In the current study, only the third 
condition of the D-KEFS Stroop test (i.e., the interference task) will be relied on as a 
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representation of the original Stroop test, in order to remain consistent with previous 
investigations of attention using the Stroop (e.g., Mirsky et al., 1991).  In terms of 
reliability coefficients for the D-KEFS, the Colour-Word Interference subtest has 
adequate internal consistency and test-retest reliability (r = .70-.79).  
Trail Making Test.  The D-KEFS trail making test is a variant of Reitan and 
Wolfson’s (1985) Trail Making Test (outlined below).  In the two conditions of interest 
for the current investigation, children are asked to connect numbers in ascending order 
(Condition 2) and switch between connecting numbers and letters, in order (Condition 4).  
Condition 2 is a measure of visual scanning and sequencing, while Condition 4 is a 
measure of executive functioning that assesses flexibility of thinking (Homack, Lee, & 
Riccio, 2005).  In terms of reliability coefficients for the D-KEFS, the Trail Making test 
has low internal consistency (r <  .59) and marginal test-retest reliability (r = .60-.69).     
Test of Everyday Attention for Children 
The Test of Everyday Attention for Children (TEA-Ch) is a battery of nine 
subtests that measure different attentional processes in children aged 16 and under 
(Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & Nimmo-Smith, 1999).  The three primary factors of 
attention assessed by this battery are: focused (selective) attention, sustained attention, 
and attention control/switching (Manly et al., 1999).  In the current investigation, three of 
the nine subtests will be examined; the subtests are described below.  Manly et al. (1999) 
reviewed a study of children with traumatic brain injury who demonstrated significant 
deficits in the three factors of attention (i.e., selective attention, sustained attention, and 
attentional control) on the TEA-Ch.  
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Sky Search.  The Sky Search (SS) subtest of the TEA-Ch is a measure of 
selective or focused attention (Manly et al., 1999).  Children are asked to circle the 20 
identical pairs of spaceships among a set of distracters, as quickly as possible.  When 
they are done, they are asked to check the box in the bottom right-hand corner to stop the 
time.  To control for motor speed, the children are asked to circle all of the target pairs of 
spaceships, in an array without distracters.  The SS target score is based on the number of 
pairs circled (i.e., how many of the 20 targets were identified).  The SS attention score is 
adjusted for motor speed based on their performance on the second part of the test 
(Strauss et al., 2006).  According to Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the 
SS subtest is very high (r = .90).    
Score!.  The Score! task is a measure of auditory sustained attention (Manly et al., 
1999).  Children are asked to count the number of “beeps” they hear on a tape, until they 
hear the signal to provide the examiner with the total score.  Targets are separated by 
long gaps, thus increasing the demands on the child’s sustained attention (Strauss et al., 
2006).  According to Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the Score! subtest is 
marginal (r = .64).    
Sky Search Dual Task.  The Sky Search Dual Task (SS DT) is a dual-task 
measure of sustained and divided attention (Manly et al., 1999).  Children are asked to 
complete a version of the visual stimuli used in the Sky Search task, while also counting 
the number of “beeps” presented, as in the Score! task, to determine whether performance 
is significantly affected by the divided attention component.  The task ends when the 
child has completed the visual search task.  Time to completion is calculated along with 
104 
 
the percentage of counting item identified correct (Strauss et al., 2006).  According to 
Manly et al. (2001), the test-retest reliability of the SS DT subtest is high (r = .81). 
Trail Making Test 
The trail making test (Trails; Reitan & Wolfson, 1985) is designed to tap selective 
attention/visual search and the capacity to switch attention.  Trails A is considered a 
measure of attention, while Trails B requires greater executive functioning, and is more 
reliant on shifting, sequencing, and perseveration (Mitrushina, Boone, Razani, & D’Elia, 
2005).  In this test, children are asked to draw lines connecting consecutive numbers 
(Trails A) or alternating numbers and letters (Trails B; Strauss et al., 2006).  Both the 
scores from Reitan and Wolfon’s  (1985) Trail Making Test and the D-KEFS Trail 
Making Test subtests will make up the Trail Making Test (Trails) variables in the current 
investigation, using z-scores.   
Strauss et al. (2006) review various studies examining the reliability and validity 
of the Trail Making Test.  According to Strauss et al. (2006), the test-retest reliability 
varies depending on the age and population studied, but is generally adequate (i.e., r = 
.70-.79).  For adults, test-retest reliability tends to be in the low range (r = .46 - .55) for 
Trails A and in the low to adequate range (r = .44 - .75) for Trails B.  Test-retest 
reliability in a sample of children was low for Trails A (r = .41) and marginal for Trails B 
(r = .65).  
Trails A and B appear to correlate moderately well with one another (r = .31-.60; 
Strauss et al., 2006).  Evidence from a variety of investigations have demonstrated that 
the Trail Making Test correlates with other aspects related to attention (i.e., visual search, 
scanning, and speed), as well as other tests of attention (e.g., PASAT; Strauss et al., 
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2006).  The trail making test has been shown to be sensitive to neurological impairment 
and traumatic brain injury, but is not as sensitive in cases of mild head injury (Strauss et 
al., 2006).   
Wechsler Intelligence Scales 
Either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WAIS-IV) or 
the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III, WISC-IV) was administered to 
all participants.  Due to the relatively limited occurrence of paediatric stroke, the current 
sample size was maximized by including children who have been assessed over the past 
20 years; therefore, the participants have received different versions of the Wechsler 
Intelligence battery.  This is common practice in larger neuropsychological studies and, 
given the thorough analyses involved in test development to ensure convergent validity 
(Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003) it is considered an acceptable procedure 
(Westmacott et al., 2010).  American norms were used for the Weschler Intelligence 
Scales.   
Digit Span.  The digit span subtest involves asking children to repeat strings of 
digits of increasing length, both forwards and backwards.  For decades, the digit span 
subtest has been purported to measure a wide range of attention processes, including 
auditory short term/working memory, mental control, flexibility, immediate memory, 
phonological processing, information processing, span of attention (see Hale, Hoeppner, 
& Fiorello, 2002 for a review).  Hale et al. (2002) found that both Digits Forward and 
Backward were predictive of attention, executive function and behavioural rating 
measures.  In particular, the authors found that Digits Backward was predictive of 
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attention and executive functions, but not the short term auditory memory processes, 
which are predicted by Digits Forward (Hale et al., 2002).   
The reliability estimates for Digit Span on the WISC-III and WISC-IV are high (r 
= .85 and r = .87, respectively) and the correlation between the two versions of the 
subtest is adequate (r = .76; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003).  The stability coefficient 
for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is high (r = 
.83; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003).  For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al., 2006), the 
internal consistency estimate and reliability coefficient for Digit Span are both very high 
(r = .93 and r = .98, respectively).  The test-retest coefficient, corrected for variability of 
the normative sample, is high (r = .83) for all ages, and adequate (r = .75) for individuals 
ages 16 through 29 years.  For the WAIS-III (Strauss et al., 2006), test-retest reliability of 
Digit Span is high (r = .80-.89) and internal consistency is very high (r = .90+).  
Coding.  The Coding subtest is a measure of visuomotor coordination, motor and 
processing speed, as well as visual working memory.  Children are asked to copy the 
symbols paired with either geometric shapes or numbers using a key, within a 120-second 
time interval (Strauss et al., 2006).   
The reliability estimates for Coding on the WISC-III and WISC-IV are relatively 
high (r = .79 and r = .85, respectively) and the correlation between the two versions of 
the subtest is adequate (r = .77; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003).  The stability 
coefficient for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is 
very high (r = .92; Williams, Weiss, & Rolfhus, 2003).  For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al., 
2006), the internal consistency estimate for Coding is high (r = .86).  The test-retest 
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coefficient, corrected for variability of the normative sample, is high (r = .86) for all ages, 
as well as for individuals ages 16 through 29 years (r = .85).  
Letter-Number Sequencing.  The letter-number sequencing subtest measures 
auditory short term/working memory and mental flexibility.  Children are read a random 
sequence of numbers and letters and are asked to repeat them back to the examiner in 
ascending numerical and alphabetical order (Strauss et al., 2006).   
For the WISC, Letter-Number Sequencing subtest estimates are only available for 
the 4
th
 edition (WISC-IV) when the subtest was introduced.  The reliability estimate for 
Letter-Number Sequencing on the WISC-IV is very high (r = .90).  The stability 
coefficient for the WISC-IV, corrected for the variability of the standardization sample is 
high (r = .83).  For the WAIS-IV (Strauss et al., 2006), the internal consistency estimate 
and reliability coefficient for Letter-Number Sequencing are both high (r = .88 and r = 
.90, respectively).  The test-retest coefficient, corrected for variability of the normative 
sample, is high (r = .80) for all ages, and for individuals ages 16 through 29 years (r = 
.83).  For the WAIS-III (Strauss et al., 2006), test-retest reliability of Letter-Number 
Sequencing is adequate (r = .70-.79) and the internal consistency is high (r = .80-.89).      
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948) assesses 
abstraction and the ability to shift cognitive strategies in response to feedback.  The test is 
a measure of executive function that requires strategic planning, searching, relying on 
feedback to shift cognitive set, and inhibition of impulsive behaviour (Strauss et al., 
2006).  Children are asked to place each response card below one of the four key cards, 
based on their own opinion of where it should go.  The experimenter responds “right” or 
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“wrong” depending on the given sorting rule, which switches from colour, to form, to 
number, without warning, after every 10 consecutive correct responses.   
Scores can be derived based on a number of factors.  The most common scores of 
interest include: 1) number of categories completed (raw scores); 2) number of  trials to 
complete the first category (raw scores); 3) number of errors (T scores) and 4) 
perseverative responses (T scores) represent the number of items in which the child 
persists in responding to a stimulus characteristic that is incorrect; 5) loss of set (raw 
scores) occurs whenever a child makes an error after 5 or more correct consecutive 
responses.  Consistent with previous investigations of attention models (e.g., Mirsky et 
al., 1991), the scores of interest in the current investigation included the number of errors 
(T-scores), number of perseverative errors (T-scores) and the number of categories 
achieved (raw scores).  
 From the WCST manual (Heaton et al., 1993), inter-rater agreement is reported to 
be high for nonperseverative errors (r = .75-.88) and very high for perseverative errors (r 
= .92-.97).  Inter-rater consistency is very high for both nonperseverative and 
perseverative errors (r = .91 and r = .94, respectively). With a sample of children, inter-
rater reliability coefficients ranged from r =.895 to r = 1.000.  Heaton et al. (1993) 
reviewed several investigations demonstrating that the WCST is a valid measure of 
executive function in children and adolescent with neurological impairment, including 
attention deficit disorder, reading disability, seizure disorder, and traumatic brain injury.   
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Appendix B 
 
The number of individuals who suffered strokes between the ages of 0 and 18 years old.  
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Appendix C 
Breakdown of Age at Stroke variables (in years) across the tests of attention.  
 
  
Age at Stroke 
Tests of Attention Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
All tests 17.59 0.00 17.59 4.66 5.22 27.30 1.04 -0.04 
Stroop 17.24 0.00 17.24 4.42 5.25 27.56 1.08 -0.07 
Trails A 17.27 0.00 17.27 4.14 4.93 24.30 1.22 0.58 
Trails B 17.27 0.00 17.27 4.33 5.03 25.33 1.19 0.46 
TEA-Ch SS  15.90 0.00 15.90 3.30 3.89 15.17 1.39 1.44 
TEA-Ch Score! 15.90 0.00 15.90 3.18 3.91 15.25 1.46 1.60 
TEA-Ch SS DT 15.90 0.00 15.90 3.05 3.83 14.67 1.71 2.59 
WCST Errors 17.27 0.00 17.27 5.01 5.17 26.71 0.94 -0.15 
WCST Perseverative  17.27 0.00 17.27 4.98 5.18 26.85 0.96 -0.14 
WCST Categories 17.59 0.00 17.59 5.34 5.48 30.04 0.86 -0.47 
Digit Span 17.59 0.00 17.59 4.82 5.21 27.11 0.98 -0.15 
Coding 17.27 0.00 17.27 4.42 4.85 23.53 1.03 0.10 
Letter Number 
Sequencing 
17.59 0.00 17.59 3.95 4.94 24.42 1.38 0.95 
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for 
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of 
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.  
² Age represented in years. 
  1
1
0
 
111 
 
Appendix D 
The number of individuals who were tested between the ages of 4 and 24 years old.  
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Appendix E 
Breakdown of Age at Testing variables (in years) across tests of attention.  
 
  
Age at Testing 
Tests of Attention Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
All tests 19.84 3.42 23.26 11.51 3.99 15.95 0.35 -0.58 
Stroop 14.82 8.44 23.26 13.36 3.41 11.60 0.61 -0.19 
Trails A 14.68 6.03 20.70 12.02 3.58 12.82 0.35 -0.69 
Trails B 14.52 6.18 20.70 12.15 3.49 12.18 0.40 -0.57 
TEA-Ch SS  12.15 6.18 18.33 10.91 3.03 9.20 0.40 -0.71 
TEA-Ch Score! 12.15 6.18 18.33 10.84 2.96 8.73 0.41 -0.60 
TEA-Ch SS DT 12.15 6.18 18.33 10.60 2.93 8.58 0.59 -0.16 
WCST Errors 16.38 6.88 23.26 12.87 3.46 11.97 0.43 -0.21 
WCST Perseverative 16.38 6.88 23.26 12.84 3.46 11.99 0.45 -0.18 
WCST Categories 16.38 6.88 23.26 13.12 3.47 12.06 0.31 -0.35 
Digit Span 14.55 6.03 20.58 11.75 3.66 13.38 0.40 -0.82 
Coding 16.38 4.20 20.58 11.40 3.54 12.50 0.41 -0.66 
Letter Number 
Sequencing 
14.55 6.03 20.58 11.69 3.63 13.19 0.40 -0.76 
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for 
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of 
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved. 
² Age represented in years. 
  11
2
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Appendix F 
Breakdown of Time since Stroke variables (in years) across tests of attention.  
 
  
Time Since Stroke 
Tests of Attention Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
All tests 17.44 0.00 17.44 6.85 4.10 16.77 0.27 -0.52 
Stroop 17.43 0.01 17.44 8.94 3.84 14.74 -0.30 -0.03 
Trails A 17.44 0.00 17.44 7.89 4.05 16.43 0.00 -0.47 
Trails B 17.44 0.00 17.44 7.82 4.17 17.37 0.01 -0.53 
TEA-Ch SS  16.74 0.01 16.75 7.60 3.72 13.81 0.08 -0.34 
TEA-Ch Score! 15.81 0.01 15.82 7.66 3.62 13.09 -0.07 -0.47 
TEA-Ch SS DT 14.47 0.20 14.66 7.55 3.53 12.43 -0.13 -0.51 
WCST Errors 17.44 0.00 17.44 7.85 4.10 16.83 -0.02 -0.43 
WCST Perseverative 17.44 0.00 17.44 7.86 4.12 16.99 -0.02 -0.45 
WCST Categories 17.44 0.00 17.44 7.78 4.31 18.54 -0.02 -0.58 
Digit Span 17.43 0.01 17.44 6.93 4.13 17.05 0.23 -0.52 
Coding 16.74 0.01 16.75 6.97 3.99 15.92 0.20 -0.54 
Letter Number 
Sequencing 
17.43 0.01 17.44 7.74 3.89 15.17 0.04 -0.31 
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for 
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of 
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.  
² Age represented in years. 
1
1
3
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Appendix G 
 
Descriptive statistics for the tests of attention.  
 
  
Descriptive Statistics 
Tests of Attention N % Missing² Range Minimum Maximum Mean SD Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Stroop 80 59.2 12.00 1.00 13.00 7.93 3.47 12.04 -0.52 -0.85 
Trails A 141 28.1 6.27 -4.00 2.27 -0.44 1.38 1.90 -1.15 1.07 
Trails B 125 36.2 6.39 -4.00 2.39 -0.37 1.57 2.48 -0.91 0.04 
TEA-Ch SS 98 50.0 15.00 1.00 16.00 8.50 3.49 12.19 0.10 -0.33 
TEA-Ch Score! 99 49.5 15.00 0.00 15.00 7.60 3.46 11.96 0.10 -0.67 
TEA-Ch SS DT 76 61.2 19.00 0.00 19.00 5.39 4.16 17.28 0.74 0.48 
WCST Errors 109 44.4 61.00 27.00 88.00 50.19 11.87 140.93 0.22 -0.39 
WCST Perseverative 108 44.9 62.00 20.00 82.00 50.84 11.39 129.65 0.05 0.41 
WCST Categories 113 42.3 6.00 1.00 7.00 4.93 1.55 2.39 -1.17 0.08 
Digit Span 166 15.3 16.00 1.00 17.00 8.52 3.27 10.69 -0.01 -0.20 
Coding 161 17.9 16.00 1.00 17.00 7.32 3.36 11.27 0.29 -0.08 
Letter-Number Sequencing 129 34.2 14.00 1.00 15.00 8.66 3.29 10.80 -0.52 -0.25 
¹Stroop: Stroop Inhibition test; Trails A: Trail Making Test A; Trails B: Trail Making Test B; TEA-Ch: Test of Everyday Attention for 
Children; TEA-Ch SS: Sky Search Attention; SS DT: Sky Search Dual Task; WCST: Wisconsin Card Sorting Test; Errors: Number of 
Errors; Perseverative: Number of Perseverative Errors; Categories: Number of Categories Achieved.  
²Percentage of individuals who were not administered the test of attention
1
1
4
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Appendix H 
Factor matrix of Mirsky’s four factors of attention determined by Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis including both the Adult and Child batteries (Mirsky, 1991).   
 
Focus/Execute Sustain Shift Encode 
Digit Symbol Substitutionᵃ CPT Hitsᵃᵇ WCST Categoriesᵃᵇ Digit Spanᵃᵇ 
Stroop (Word, Colour, Inhibition)ᵃ CPT Commissionsᵃᵇ WCST Correctᵃᵇ Arithmeticᵃᵇ 
Trails Aᵃ CPT RTᵃᵇ WCST Errorsᵃ  
Trails Bᵃ    
Cancellationᵃ    
Cancellation Omissionsᵇ    
Cancellation Completion Timeᵇ    
Codingᵇ    
ᵃ Adult battery  
ᵇ Child battery  
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